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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal link between political institutions and 
economic growth in developing countries. We investigate what criteria are necessary to 
form sustainable political institutions, and what policies were taken to build a 
sustainable economy. We seek to investigate the nexus by using a comparative case 
study of Zambia and South Korea. The data collection is composed by qualitative data of 
on multiple sources of evidence and is based on area studies within the timeframe of 
post-World War II to post-millennium. We make use of two prominent theories to 
explain the correlation; the theory of economic institutionalism and the concept of state 
autonomy and intervention. We conclude that inclusive political institutions are crucial 
to the prospect of economic growth. Moreover, we conclude that reinvestment of 
revenue in the industry is the foundation of building strong economies 
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Introduction 
 
Problem field 
The interest of writing this paper was initiated in the project formation during a 
discussion of weak states and the (in)effect of development aid on certain weak states. It 
caught our attention that certain fragile economies had remained resistant to 
progressing while others had economically flourished and it struck us, that investigating 
development assistance would not help us answer the question. More specifically, we 
noticed that many African states remain weak whereas many East Asian states have 
become middle-income countries. As a consequence, the group decided to investigate 
these phenomena and chose to explore the role of domestic institutions to understand 
the path countries have taken in their quest towards economic development. Therefore, 
this project investigates the link between political institutions and economic 
development. 
 
The scope of this project is to investigate the causal relations between political 
institutions and levels of economic development. It will do so by analysing two case 
studies and is therefore conducted by the case study method. The first case study is the 
weak state Zambia and the second is the late developer South Korea. The case studies 
are postcolonial states and therefore have similar points of departure. Interestingly, the 
countries have taken different trajectories towards economic development and thus 
have reached highly different results. The case studies will be applied to investigate how 
different political institutions result in different trajectories of economic development. 
 
Problem formulation: 
“What is the causal relation between political institutions and level of economic 
development?” 
 
Working questions: 
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 How do colonial legacy effect current political institutions? 
 What criteria are necessary to form sustainable political institutions? 
 What kind of policies where taken to build a sustainable economy? 
 
Concept clarification  
‘Weak states’; the projects refers to the concept of weak states as states that lacks basic 
attributes such as effective institutions, monopoly on the instruments of violence and 
consensus on the idea of the state. 
 
‘Institutions’; institutions are made up of formal rules, informal norm and their 
enforcement characteristics. The formal rules constitute laws, constitutions and 
regulations, whereas the informal norms constitute the way things are done. 
 
‘State’; critics of the state autonomy theory condemn the vague definition of ‘state’ is 
creating disagreement among scholars. To elaborate, the authors use ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
to describe state’s abilities to influence or control other domestic and international 
actors, rather than military or economic power as realist would. 
 
Delimitations 
Certain delimitations are made throughout the project to maintain consistency. First, the 
time frame is limited to post-World War II to present time, as we find including the 
colonial era to the cases studies would be too extensive and out of scope with the 
purpose of the paper. Moreover, the countries had different colonisers, which the paper 
will not regard.  
 
Second, the project is focused on the domestic political institutions of the case studies, 
and is therefore delimitated from regarding general international policies and 
international law. It will look at the effects exogenous policies have on the domestic 
policies but not analyse the international policies in dept. 
 
Third, the case studies are based on countries without variables that could have affected 
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the causal links of institutional policies on economic development programmes. The 
variables include from civil war and other forms of violent conflicts and extreme natural 
disasters such as hurricanes or heavy drought. 
 
Fourth, when the project applies the term ‘development’ it refers to economic 
development and not development assistance.  This means the project does not regard 
normative measure of development; such as social development, equity development, or 
human capital development. 
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Methodology 
 
Research design 
The chosen method of this project is the case study method and more importantly, a 
comparative case study. This method was selected because case studies are preferred in 
situations where the subject of study is not readily distinguishable from its context (Yin, 
1993: 1) and when aiming to attribute a causal relationship (Yin, 1993: 31). In other 
words, the method was chosen to shed a light on two different contextual conditions of 
economic development and to analyse them in accordance with the relevant theo ry. The 
method will therefore help us choose cases, analyse the cases in relation to theory, 
compare results, conclude and thus answer our problem definition and research 
questions. Therefore, the project is made up of two case studies, both being descriptive 
cases. Furthermore, to compare the cases, we have made use of systematic replications 
based on contextual periods of importance to each case. The project will be conducted 
following logical positivism because of the collection and analysis of empirical data. The 
data collection is composed by qualitative data of on multiple sources of evidence and is 
based on area studies within the timeframe of post World War II to post-millennium. 
 
The Case Studies 
The case studies are made by multiple sourced qualitative data, based on research 
journals and area studies. This project is making use of the inductive reasoning by 
exploring two different trajectories of economic development. It questions how two 
postcolonial states that have similar points of departure and have resulted in 
diametrically different levels of economic development? The central question of the 
project is questioning the correlation between political institutions and economic 
growth.” Moreover, how come some postcolonial states have prospered while others 
have not? To investigate this, the project makes use of multiple-case studies, first one is 
Zambia and the second is South Korea. The cases are based on similar measures; a 
periodic systematisation of vital domestic events. More importantly, the development of 
state institutions and the role plays in economic development. This was done in order 
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for us to compare the two cases, yet maintaining domestic significance and relevance of 
each case.  
The cases point towards the causal relations between institutions and growth; the 
project thus makes use of descriptive case studies. As stated, the time frame of the cases 
span from post-World War II to post-millennium. 
 
Specific reasons lie behind in choosing two countries: Zambia and South Korea. First, to 
pick a regional base for relatively underdeveloped were the African nations and second, 
a nation with a colonial past was needed to examine Acemoglu et al.’s hypothesis. In this 
sense, we specifically chose Zambia of the African nations as it fit o ur criteria that 
considers relatively underdeveloped and affected by colonialism and was not affected by 
civil war, serious toll of Mother Nature or any other encounters that may have altered its 
economic development without causal links to political insti tutions. Finally, we needed a 
nation still facing difficulties of economic prosperity; possibly a nation that even has 
indications of ‘backward economy’. 
 
Similarly, we picked out our second case considering similar standards to that of Zambia; 
colonial past, similar underdevelopment issues and no serious toll of Mother Nature or 
other variable that may have altered situations that is not of political institution. 
However, differing from the Zambian development, this time the dependent variable had 
to be a nation that has triumph economic success post-World War II. 
 
Theory 
To ensure creating strong case studies, the theories where chosen before the cases were 
produced. The project makes use of two prominent theories that each explains the 
correlation between institutions and economic development in a local context. To 
explain the correlation in the case of Zambia, a theory of economic institutionalism by 
Acemoglu et al. was chosen. Acemoglu et al. explains economic growth as an outcome of 
colonial legacy that has durably shaped national political institutions. Consequently, the 
level of Zambia’s economic development has its roots in the colonial extractive 
institutions. On the other hand, South Korea is analysed through the concept centering 
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on state autonomy and intervention by prominent authors such as Peter Evans and 
Meredith Woo-Cumings. The Developmental State is a political regime characterized by 
state interference in the market to ensure sustainable economic growth. The theories 
explain the relations between institutions and economic development within effective 
intervention by political institutions to assemble domestic policies. Therefore, the two 
sets of theories differ. Acemoglu et al. explains a historical dependency which is thus 
based on history, whereas, the Developmental State explains political governance in the 
creation of economic prosperity. 
 
Before selecting the theories we embarked a discussion of economic development; how 
come many African states are consistently considered as ‘weak states’ and how come 
many Asian states have prospered so well? The two theories help explain our questions, 
decide which cases to use and what should be emphasised in the case studies. Thus we 
choose a Sub-Saharan state without violent conflicts and one of the ‘Asian tigers’. 
Without different and strong theories, it would be impossible to explain the different 
trajectories the two states have taken. Theory is a priori. 
 
After choosing theory and composing the case studies, the project conducts an analysis. 
The analysis put the theories into play to test them on the case studies. The case studies 
examine the validity of the theories and analyse the correlations between institutions 
and economic development using specific cases.  
 
Validity and Reliability 
The project ensures reliability by periodic systematisation of vital domestic events in 
both case studies. Moreover, the a priori theory as well as the criticizing a priori theory 
ensures internal validity of the project, as it ensures a critical perspective of the cases 
and theories. The case studies each represent regional tendencies and the chosen 
theories are created to explain such tendencies. The theories can thus be replicated on 
other countries with the same point of departure and can explain other cases than the 
ones chosen for this project. Consequently, the theories and case studies are 
representative and generalisations can be made. Thus, the project is internally and 
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externally valid (Yin, 1993: 39 f).  
 
Course Literature 
Initially our interest in weak states and their situation sprang from the perspective on 
aid. Aid has been distributed from the Western Hemisphere to the third world in over 40 
years still, the weak states remain weak. To be able to find a reasonable cause for this we 
would obviously have to investigate the economic perspective of this problem. We 
initially wanted to investigate the political institutions and their effect on the 
development of the state, but we discovered that in order to draw a conclusion on this 
effect, we had to investigate the effect of the institutions on economic growth. That is 
why we chose to investigate the causal link between political institutions and economic 
growth. 
 
When investigating the weak states and their trajectory, we cannot disregard 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is a fundamental term that we covered in class, and that we 
need to be able to account for in this project since the situation of our case studies is 
newly gained independence as sovereign states. This is why we bring in John Hopson 
and Robert Jackson. Robert Jacksons work is also used in another correlation, the quasi-
states. In order to understand the concept of weak states we need to understand the 
concept of quasi-states, and that is a concept investigated thoroughly by Robert Jackson. 
Also, we need a background of colonialism which is very important in order to 
understand our theory and the state of art we build this project on. The case studies 
each have important ties to their former colonial power. The course literature will 
provide us with the connections we need to understand, and the general overview and 
understanding of the colonial era. The course literature is meant as a supplement for 
our knowledge on the subject, not as a basis for our investigation. 
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Literature Review 
 
The literature review will present the theory of the project. First it presents Bringing the 
State Back in, then The Developmental State, followed by The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: and Empirical investigation.   
 
Bringing the State Back In 
Until late 1970s, the word “state” was rarely used in the field of social science  with the 
exception of political science law. The dominant theories and research agendas of social 
sciences were heavily focused on society. However, since 1980s, interest grew with the 
emphasis on the proficiencies of the state on development as certain nations showed 
drastically different progress and process in economic development after the World War 
II.  
 
Skocpol, Evans, and Reuschemeyer (1985) “brings the state back in” to highlight the 
importance of state as an actor that is influenced by society, but more importantly, state 
influences and shape the society and policy. Skocpol et al. argues measuring the role of 
the state in society-based, class-based (Marxism) and economic (Keynesianism) 
explanations of political behaviour is incomplete. Rather, she examines the Third Way of 
state autonomy and the capacity to affect policy and the relation to societal influences. 
In this sense, the book conceptualizes the structure and capacities of a state. Skocpol et 
al. defines states as relatively autonomous actors or “organization claiming control over 
territories and people and may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective 
of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society” (Skocpol, 1985: 9) . In 
other words, in the aims of effectively managing economic problems states influence on 
society and the capacity – interventions or abstentions – is important. 
 
In this manner, first, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter Evans discuss the state strategies 
in newly industrializing countries (NICs). It examines how state can intervene to help 
the domestic development projections, listing criteria for effective intervention. Yet they 
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discuss the difficulties in doing so and conclude the result of intervention is ambivalent. 
Second, Evans discusses the states in relation to the post-World War II international 
economy in reflection of Wallenstein’s World System theory. However, the difference 
with the theory is that Evans concludes both core and the periphery can both prosper; 
however, in separate manner. 
 
Criteria for Effective Interventions 
Rueschemeyer and Evans’ main argument is that state intervention is necessary if 
capitalist economies are to sustain capital accumulation and reach higher levels of 
productivity. They emphasise the need of a direct assertion of collectively oriented 
administrative rationality for capital accumulation in both advanced and industrializing 
countries. However, this does not imply they are in line with collectivist belief of 
complete state-managed and state-led development; they believe state intervention as 
necessary for development, but only when government fully recognize capitalism. The 
two authors outline four main conditions for justifiable and well-working intervention. 
 
Influenced by Max Weber’s bureaucratic organization as the most efficient form of 
organizing large-scale administrative activities, the authors specify four main aspects in 
evaluating state effectiveness: construction of adequate bureaucrats, organization of 
distribution, centralization and decentralization, and state-owned enterprises. He 
discusses the need and the difficulty of achieving or the benefits and limitations once it 
functions. 
 
First, a state needs to construct an adequate set of bureaucrats that will provide policies 
different from and unaffected by private elites (esprit de corps). In addition, the 
bureaucrats must understand and outline the state’s abilities and implement relevant 
and sufficient policies through information gathering. However, expertise does not 
always intervene effectively due to the complexity of inter-related relationships within 
the nation. Nevertheless, state managers will eventually shape policies. In this sense, 
Evans believes effective bureaucratic machinery is the key to the state’s capacity to 
intervene. 
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Second, effective bureaucratic organization criteria lie on its capacity to organize and 
distribute income and wealth. Bureaucrats cannot rely on information processing and 
mechanism of the market but be involved in in relations between the dominant and 
subordinate. However, lack of organization capacity could become a serious obstacle to 
effective intervention in redistributing wealth. In this sense, for greater autonomy, 
division among private elites (dominant class) is an important precondition. 
 
Third, the state must know when to centralize and decentralize; planning at the centre 
and control of resources for decentralized agencies may achieve coordination, but 
central resource control is often difficult to balance with real delegation of decision 
making. The authors present dual bureaucratic structures to deal with the problem of 
overarching centralization; but are also problematic because it is probable to lead to 
tension between and coordination problems  
 
Lastly is the state’s influence in the market, specifically enterprises. Empirically, State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) tend to be the central part of state policy in Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs). There are certain benefits of SOEs: setting clear agenda 
and objectives, minimized political interference. SOEs help state to participate directly 
to accumulate but also diminish the risks of decentralization such as inefficiency and 
corruption by keeping track of performance. However, there are also risks of firms 
developing characteristics of oligarchy. 
 
All in all, effective state intervention is predicated on the existence of a well-developed 
bureaucratic apparatus. However, state bureaucrats must be aware of the difficulties of 
implementing effective intervention. As mentioned above, all criteria have potential for 
both positive and negative result. But what is for sure definite is that, to achieve such 
structure of state, it takes time. Yet, when the conditions are met, state autonomy 
becomes the key for effective state action.  
 
However, it must be highlighted once again that their argument is different from Marxist 
market system in that state bureaucrats are willing to sacrifice the interests of certain 
segments of capital in the pursuit of policies that maintain viable economy. “Only when 
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the state has become thoroughly capitalist in its orientation is the positive relation 
between state autonomy and accumulation likely to be strong.” (Evans  in Skocpol et al., 
1985: 60) All in all, it has become a constant tug-of-war between state action and 
market functioning.  
 
Transnational Relations and the Role of State 
In the next part of the book, Evans elaborates the implication of transnational relations 
and economic role of the state in the post-World War II and discusses state capabilities. 
Markets have always been transnational; however, in the contemporary period, the 
characteristic has become much more pervasive. In this part of the text, Evans uses the 
dependency approach or world system perspective; but concludes by suggesting that 
there is a possibility of the developed core and the exploited periphery to benefit 
simultaneously, yet independently. Evans considers and examines the interaction 
between transnational economic interests and geopolitical goals regarding the Third 
World states (periphery) and the advanced industrial states (core). 
 
When explaining transnational linkage in Third World States, Evans focuses on the role 
of the state in attaining external and internal source of finance; foreign direct 
investment (transnational corporations) and indirect investment (sovereign or 
government-guaranteed debt). He quotes “where states stand in this area largely 
depends on where they sit.” At the periphery state, developing countries can effectively 
control transnational corporations in extractive industries; in this regard, in Evans 
definition, these states would be ‘strong’ states, in other words, state has strong 
influence on the economic industry. 
 
All in all, the book clearly shows that states are important actors and that governmental 
institutions can have an important, if not decisive, impact on the societies they 
represent. The states should be included as an active element with the dynamic of state 
policy and shaping society. In this respect, the main finding of the book is that the state 
is an important – if not the most important – actor in political phenomena. 
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Critiques of the Book 
Advocators of state autonomy theory can be seen in the next section – the 
Developmental State – where it also supports the state as the chief actor in conducting 
economic plans and development. Other advocators go on further “to bring the state 
and the domestic back in (alongside the international)” (Hobson, 2002: 437), such as 
Geroge Sorensen in his book Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International 
Relations. 
 
However, there are critiques of state intervention. One of the main criticizer is Jens 
Bartelson (2001) in his book The Critique of the State. His view on statism is ambivalent; 
on one hand, he views the state as the ultimate source of political authority, but on the 
other hand as a demarcated from society and the international realm. He draws out that 
we can only criticize state once we break ‘state-authority’ idea and analyses two critical 
approaches to statism: first, pluralist who wants to kick the state out, and second, 
Marxist who wants a process that enforces the prevailing statist discourse rather than 
state-autonomy. 
 
Pluralists are social scientists who hold that there are no single unified power elite 
whereas there are many competing power elites with differing backgrounds, values and 
bases of support in the broader society. Because they do not believe the state as the 
single power of leader, it rejects statism. Moreover, their understanding of power var ies 
from legal authority, capital, prestige, and so on; whereas Skocpol et al. conceptualize 
power as how state could effectively control and influence the society. In this sense, 
Pluralists interprets economic development through interaction of various 
organizations, including government organizations and non-government organizations; 
rather than the state that has the ultimate power to implement economic 
developmental plans. 
 
Another critical view comes from the Marxist. Marxist also emphasizes the state as the 
most important characteristic. However, Marxists emphasized collectivist society or 
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communism theory, where control and decision-making would be in the hands of 
people as a whole. His idea was behind the notion that coercive state would wither 
human greed, competition, and disposition created by class domination. He considers 
these factors arise from capitalism. In this sense, Marxist differs from one of the core 
foundations of developmental state; it rejects capitalism. However, in Skocpol et al. ’s 
view, capitalism must be fully aware by the state and must be able to gather information 
and understand its dynamics in pursuit of economic development. 
 
The previous section argues important criteria to making an efficient state intervention 
in the economic development through analysing the role of states. The following part 
will elaborate on this by including the concept of The Developmental State. 
 
The Developmental State 
Many developing states have continuously suffered from negative growth in their annual 
GDP per capita. Only a small number have reached moderate growth from 1.5 – 3.5 
percent, and few reached annual growth rates from 1965 to 1990, exceeding 4 percent 
(Leftwich, 1995: 400). The states with the highest growth of annual GDP per capita were 
most often East Asian or Southeast Asian states characterised Developmental States. 
 
The following section explains the economic success of Northeast Asia as a product of 
‘The Developmental State’ (henceforth DS). The DS is the political, bureaucratic and 
moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia (Woo -
Cumings in Woo-Cumings et al., 1999: 1), and explains the way in which politics 
effectively contribute to nation’s economic position rather than simply relying on 
market forces. The conceptualisation of the DS can be drawn back to Frederich List’s 
perception that less advanced nations must use the state to catch up with developed 
ones. However, the concept gained momentum after the examination of the Japanese 
economic success conducted by Chalmers Johnson in “MITI and the Japanese Miracle – 
the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975”, from 1982, and refers to state led 
macroeconomic planning where coherent state-intervention of the market creates 
extensive economic growth. The model is thus a middle ground between the 
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dichotomising explanations of the East and West; plan-ideology and the regulatory state. 
The DS is thus termed the plan-rational state, which is a combination of private 
ownership and state guidance, and is therefore a take on different capitalism. Traits of 
the DS are significant for many Northeast Asian states with high economic growth, 
especially Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
 
The DS has its roots in mercantilism; namely the view that economic activity should be 
the basis for political power governed by a strong state. Moreover, the DS flourishes in 
nationalist states as a reaction to an external threat. This is exemplified in the way in 
which exports are encouraged and imports are discouraged in order for the state to 
maintain domestic employment. In other words, it is the mission of the developmental 
state-model to produce long-term economic enhancement by actively creating 
comparative advantages for the nation at the expense of rivalling national powers. The 
model was put into action because economic development was perceived as the best 
way for late developers to combat Western dominance and imperialism, hence, ensure 
national survival. 
 
Central factors for the Development State 
Central for the DS is ‘a determined developmental elite’; small and tight group of 
politicians and bureaucrats close to the government, ‘relative autonomy’; an 
autonomous elite and institution, a powerful, ‘competent and insulated economic  
bureaucracy’; strong bureaucracy to handle state and economy interactions, ‘a weak and 
subordinate civil society’; easily centralised or coordinated by a strong state, ‘the 
effective management of non-state economic interest and repression’; investments 
carried out by the state, and lastly, legitimacy and performance; receiving legitimacy by 
creating economic development (Leftwich, 1995: 405). 
 
Governance of the Developmental State 
According to Pempel, there are different versions of capitalism and different versions of 
economic development and the DS represents one perspective. When the developmental 
state functions well it is a mutual beneficial relationship where neither state officials nor 
the civilian enterprise managers predominates the other. To ensure success, governing 
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of state within this particular framework requires an exceedingly competent and 
autonomous national bureaucracy (Pempel in Woo-Cumings et al. 1999: 139). Economic 
development is thus a political constructed process, carried out by governmental 
bureaucrats and technocrats to improve national competitiveness. In the case of Japan, 
Johnson explains that the elite state bureaucracy who governs the state are recruits of 
the country’s top law schools, plan almost all laws, ordinances, orders, regulations and 
licences that govern society and thus are unrestrained by the judicial system (Johnson in 
Woo-Cumings, 1999:14). Therefore, the role of the bureaucracy is to create broad 
industrial policy, detect the means to implementing it and ensure highly regulated 
competition in designated strategic sectors (ibid). The Japanese Ministry of Internal 
Trade and Industry (MITI), has the instruments to create conducive as well as 
obstructive business environments for the private sector by altering market incentives, 
reducing risks, offering entrepreneurial visions and managing conflict (Johnson in Woo -
Cumings, 1999: 48). The quality of bureaucracy thus depends on the skill of detecting 
the needs for policies, adapting them as well as knowing when to  stop them, in 
continuously transforming contexts. The DS is thus a contrast to the currently prevailing 
neoliberalism practiced by liberal democracies of the West. 
 
Industrial Policies 
The national bureaucracy is the body that conduct the industrial policies and is central 
in the developmental state. Industrial policies are not contrary to the market but rather 
a strategy for the state when trying to influence the behaviour of producers, consumers 
and investors. Therefore, the industrial policies are continually changing, it is an attitude, 
an orientation and after that a matter of technique shifting with the changing needs of 
the time being (Woo-Cumings in Woo-Cumings et al. 1999: 31). Generally, industrial 
policies are characterised by state intervention in areas important to economic success 
and enables the state to: 
 
“extract capital, generate and implement national economic plans, manipulate private 
access to scarce resource, coordinate the efforts of individual businesses, target specific 
industrial projects, resist political pressures from popular forces such as consumers and 
organised labour, insulate their domestic economies from extensive foreign capital 
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penetration, and most especially carry through a sustained project for ever-improving 
productivity, technological sophistication, and increased world market shares” (Pempel in 
Woo-Cumings et al. 1999: 139). 
 
According to Johnson the Japanese ‘miracle’ was able to take form due to the “conscious 
and consistent governmental policies from the 1920’ties”  an onwards (Johnson in Woo-
Cumings et al. 1999, 37). For other states to match the Japanese economic achievements , 
states must adopt the priority of developing; it must be a developmental state before it 
is a regulatory state, a welfare state etc. (Johnson in Woo-Cumings et al. 1999, 37). 
 
The external environment 
Although the DS interferes in the market it is to a large extend dependent on the 
external environment. According to Pempel, the state is a Janus faces entity facing inside 
as well as outside, mediating between the outside and the domestic society. Regional 
powers, superpowers, regional power balances, cross-national rules and relations 
governing trade, investment and energy, are important external factors that plays a role 
for the opportunities of the DS (Pempel in Woo-Cumings et al. 1999: 146f ). 
 
Obstacles of the model 
Pempel critiques scholars who present the bureaucracy as being depoliticised and in a 
rational pursuit of self-evident national interests (Pempel in Woo-Cumings et al. 1999: 
144), which he argues is a too simplistic and not correct. Quite contrary, there are issues 
connected to the DS. For instance, the central role of the bureaucracy is the creation of 
industrial policy, which blurs the lines between the private and the public sectors. 
Therefore, the insurance of state intervention in industries can arguably foster 
irresponsible corporate investments. Moreover, cases of structural corruption and crony 
capitalism have been documented. Those are examples of industrial policy being used to 
protect vested interests in oligopolistic conglomerates rather than creating national 
development or where family linage might be prioritised over utilitarian economic 
development. A central critique of the developmental state is thus, who benefits from 
intervention? Civil society of the developmental state is generally neglected as well as 
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under-investigated. 
   
Emulation of the Model 
According to Johnson, duplication of the model is possible but it necessitates certain 
components. Firstly, it requires a talented elite bureaucracy to govern the state. The role 
of the bureaucracy is to identify which industries to develop, how to best develop them, 
and to supervise competition in the designated industries to ensure effectiveness. These 
duties will be performed using market-conforming method of state intervention. 
Secondly, it requires a political system where the bureaucracy is able to, judicially and 
legislatively, operates sufficiently yet is restricted in power. Thirdly, it requires a marked 
conforming method of state intervention in the economy based on administrative 
guidance and the creation of governmental financial institutions. Forth and lastly, the 
establishment of pilot organisation like MITI, which “combines planning, energy 
domestic production, international trade and share of finance” (Johnson in Johnson et al. 
1999, 38f). Concludingly, the model is generalizable, yet mostly on third world countries.  
 
This section has argued that the DS can be a conducive method for creating economic 
development, especially in third world countries. It is characterised by a high degree of 
state intervention in the market, carried out as industrial policies, to enable long-term 
economic growth, as well as creating comparative advantages for the state at the 
expense of rivalling powers. The following section will investigate the origins of current 
political institutions by tracing its colonial roots.   
 
 
Colonial inheritance in current institutions 
Political institutions matter greatly in building a nation, especially when creating 
economic growth. This is exemplified by the development of East and West Germany 
after World War II, or North and South Korea. These countries developed very 
differently because of the political institutions within. Where East Germany and North 
Korea stagnated under central planning and collective ownership, West Germany and 
South Korea prospered under the influence of market economy. Acemoglu et al. 
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emphasises the importance of the different effects these two approaches has on political 
institutions, but also takes into account that empirical data is needed to point out the 
exact link between the political institutions and economic growth. Acemoglu et al. looks 
at market economy and investment as the approach that generates economic growth 
and thereby prosperity for the nation in question, while central planning can lead to 
economic stagnation and negative growth. 
 
Acemoglu et al. explain the economic growth in the de-colonized countries with the 
status of the institutions at the time before and after independence. The institutions in 
the colonized countries were largely shaped by the colonial powers. According to 
Acemoglu et al. the institutions were shaped on the basis of the success of the settlers in 
the colonies. The Europeans had two ways of colonizing; (1) the Europeans settled in a 
country with the intention of making a “New Europe”. This meant that they installed 
institutions that were to be the basis of the political system, and generate economic 
growth by investing in the nation and generate prosperity, as in North America, Canada, 
and New Zealand. (2) Europeans colonized a country by installing extractive institutions 
designed to exploit the nation’s resources and wealth opportunities. These extractive 
institutions were run by local governors and district commissioners. Instead of making 
these countries New Europes, they simply ran the nations as proxy-nations that 
extracted resources to the mother country, with the intend of economic growth there. 
 
When looking at the second colonizing method, many European settlers died from 
endogenous diseases and the colonies were not only difficult to shape into New Europes 
but close to impossible. According to Acemoglu et al. most European colonising powers 
exploited the African continent for its resources, but never settled there. The colonised 
countries where settlers instated extractive institutions were typically the ones that 
remained weak after gaining independence. In other words, Acemoglu et al explain 
economic growth as an outcome of colonial legacy that has durably shaped national 
political institutions. 
  
Central argument 
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The hypothesis in this specific article is that the mortality of the settlers affected the 
early institutions, and the early institutions formed the basis of the current institutions. 
Acemoglu et al. takes into account different variables in their investigation of the 
connection between mortality of the settlers and the economic growth in the country. 
From the results produced, a high correlation between the institutions and the economic 
growth exists (Acemoglu et al.). Importantly, as also noticed by the authors, there are 
omitted variables in the calculations such as the lack of data in some areas, historically 
as well as geographically. 
 
To investigate this chronologically, one should look the institutional persistence. Many 
institutions in the non-settler colonies persisted after independence but did not work 
efficiently, in contrast to colonies that were actually settled like Australia, America and 
Canada. Acemoglu et al. maintains that colonised countries after independence should 
not be referred to as new nations, since the nations have inherited the extractive 
institutions from the colonial powers. Institutions run by a small elitist group increases 
the gains for the power holder than institutions run by a larger elite, and thus less 
incentive to change the institutions and creating economic prosperity. 
 
According to Acemoglu et al. there are a number of economic mechanisms that will lead 
to the persistence of extractive institutions. First of all, changing the institutions are 
costly. Second, the ruling elite may gain much by keeping the institutions as they are, 
instead of investing in the Zambian industry to create development. Third, the 
authoritarian elite would be able to extract capital not only from export, but also from 
the domestic market. After independence from the colonizing powers, the only 
difference would be the recipients of the rents (Acemoglu et al: 2000: 12). Acemoglu et 
al. argues that because the extractive policies remained intact, the extractive institutions 
did not change much. For the institutions to perform better they would have to let go of 
the extractive policies become inclusive institutions, which would benefit the general 
population. As long as the small elite have power over the institutions, there is little 
chance of changing the structure of the institutions. In other words, “those in power 
created political institutions to stay in power and amass resources” (La Porta et al., 1998: 
10). 
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As mentioned, there is a clear connection between settler mortality and the type of 
institution that were created in the colony in question. Due to diseases the colonizers 
either settled in the colony with the intend of making it into a New Europe or they 
created extractive institutions with the intend of exploiting the resources of the new 
colony. The extractive institutions remained in the countries after independence and 
formed the basis of the institutions that were to take over after independence. To 
maximise the economic growth political institutions ought to invest in the national 
industry, rather than focusing on maximising the export of resources. According to 
Acemoglu et al. the reason why African countries are poorer is not due to cultural or 
geographical factors, but is mostly accounted for by the fact that Africa has worse 
institutions (Acemoglu et al: 2000: 22).  
 
Critiques of this concept  
There are several criticisms of Acemoglu et al. First, Acemoglu et al. point out that the 
different colonized countries were inevitably shaped by their colonial powers 
(Acemoglu et al.: 2000: 1). La Porta et al. questions that Acemoglu et al. does not 
consider the institutional inherence of the colonial powers as a valid variable. However, 
Acemoglu et al. accounts for the logarithm variable by adding it to the equation, with the 
result similar to the previous. Therefore, he argues, institutions after independence not 
affected by the culture of the former colonial powers. 
 
Second, David Albouy questions the data of Acemoglu et al. and Albouy regards 
neighbouring countries as areas affected by the same diseases (Albouy, 2012: 3061). 
Albouy states that not all neighbouring countries in Africa has the same frame of 
diseases, and thus using these as benchmarks for the disease environment can create a 
huge difference between results and reality. Moreover, Albouy further questions 
Acemoglu et al. on settler mortality, which affected institutions in colonized areas after 
independence by arguing that the direct effect of settler mortality on institutions fated, 
while the indirect effect of property rights on institutions persisted (Albouy, 2012: 
3059). According to Albouy there is a general variation in the data of Acemolgu et al. , 
which affect the results of the investigation, proving that the data is not fit to measure 
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the effect on the current institutions in a given country, alone. This leaves the 
investigation without a strong empirical foundation (Albouy, 2012: 3073). 
      
Third, Jeffrey Sachs does not regard the settler mortality as valid instrument for 
analysing the failure on economic growth and prosperity (Sachs, 2012: 5). Sachs 
discusses that the institutions are not deeply rooted in colonies in fact they are often not 
linked to the colonial powers. There is little continuity between institutions the world 
over, furthermore democratic states is a volatile term since governments can change 
within decades. Arguably, as the political landscape can change, so can institutions. 
institutions change over time, when the would change as well (Sachs, 2012: 8). The 
status of the institutions at the time of independence, extractive or inclusive, will not 
only persist, they will also evolve into new institutions non-affected by their former 
colonial powers. 
 
This section latter explained economic growth as an outcome of colonial legacy that has 
durably shaped national political institutions. The following section will assess other 
explanation of the correlation. 
 
Institutions, Regimes and Diverse Assessments 
 
The following section concerns additional theory not regarded by the main scholars of 
the project. It covers theories on neo-Marxist, neo-liberalism, and New Institutional 
Economics (NIEs) focusing on their perspectives of the correlation between institutions 
and economic development. 
 
Neo–Marxism 
Neo-Marxists perceive the economy as a zero-sum game and discard the idea that the 
economic sphere ought to operate under its own rules (Jackson et al, 2010: 189). In the 
neo-Marxist perspective states are not autonomous. Rather, states are driven by the 
interests of their domestic ruling class, the bourgeois and their border crossing capital 
accumulation; capitalism. Immanuel Wallenstein ponders the neo-Marxist perspective 
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in relation to international political economy in his ‘World System Analysis’. 
 
The world system analysis by Immanuel Wallenstein is a neo-Marxist perspective that 
regards the political and economic structure of the world. Wallenstein divides countries 
between the hierarchy of core, periphery and the semi-periphery, based on their type of 
economy. The core countries conduct high skill work and encompass advanced and 
complex economic activities, the periphery conducts staple goods, and the semi-
periphery are considered the middle stratum between the latter (Jackson et al., 2010: 
193f). The world system is characterized by unequal exchange since economic surplus is 
extracted from the periphery to the core, as “strong states can enforce unequal exchange 
on weak ones” (Jackson et al., 2010: 194). According to neo-Marxists, the antagonist 
poles of the capitalist system exist in correlation of each other in an unequal system. The 
inequality of the system can accordingly create friction and semi-periphery countries 
therefore have an important function; they keep a distance between the dichotomized 
poles, and buffer the system with political stability. 
 
The hierarchy within the world economy is not static and thus countries can move from 
one group to another. This is done by restructuring economy from a conduction of high 
skill work to low skill work or vise-versa from low skill work to high skill work. Due to 
the continuing technology progress, advanced economic activity continuously alters, 
which adds to the opportunities for states to move from one categor y to another. 
However, the innovative processes required for moving from periphery to core are 
capital extensive and a change is thus not easily done.  
 
Consequently, within the neo-Marxist framework, the profit from the periphery to the 
core is considered exploitative. This exploitation first took place as colonialism, however, 
is sustained under capitalism. So, the exploitation during colonialism continues in the 
current post-colonial era under capitalism. Therefore, international institutions and 
organisations’ help sustain the unequal relationship between the core, the periphery 
and the semi-periphery countries under the capitalist market economy. 
 
Neo-Liberalism 
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The neo-liberalist market system has been prominent since the mid-1980s, where many 
governments in the developing world incorporated neoliberal restructuring policies in 
pursuit of economic development. Neoliberal restructuring policies, or “market-friendly” 
policies in World Bank jargon, put the private sector and resource allocation based on 
unrestricted markets at the centre of a new development strategy (Paus, 1994). 
 
Neo-liberals argue for free markets, free trade and free flow of capital across national 
borders. They want the state to play no role in the economy; underpinning the ‘invisible 
hand’, where self-interested individuals would use their resource to supply and demand 
for their necessities. Naturally, it will produce a market where supply meets demand; 
hence, the optimal point without any interference of the state in the market. 
 
In fact, neo-liberalists criticize government interventions for distorting the market, 
which would lead to inefficiency, lacking international competitiveness and economic 
stagnation. For this reason, they push the liberalization of markets across the board as 
the key policy prescription for renewed growth. The liberalization of labour market, 
financial market, trade, and exchange rate would lead to more efficient allocation of 
resources and exploitation of a country’s “true” comparative advantages, which would 
construct sustainable growth for the nation without the interference of the state (Paus, 
1994). The neo-liberals thus perceive the economy as a positive sum-game with benefits 
for all. Consequently, within a neo-liberal perspective, institutions are needed to make 
the ground rules of the market. Institutions and organisations are thus required to 
ensure economic growth and development. 
 
The Rational Choice Approach 
Rational choice begins with the idea that individuals have preferences and choose. The 
theory makes assumptions which posit man as a self-interested, purposeful, utility 
maximizing being. In political science, rational choice theorists find history and culture 
as irrelevant factors to understanding political behaviour. Rather, the actors’ interests 
are relevant factors and assume that they pursue their interest rationally. This differs 
from earlier decision-making approach which sought to explain decisions of elite groups 
as the center of political behavior. Rational choice theorists attempted to apply their far 
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more formal theory by using mathematical equations to all facets of political life. 
Supporters believe rational choice questions would be a break through to find an 
equation that makes political science more ‘scientific’, whereas critics are cynical that it 
is just another ‘a model that pretends to explain everything’. 
 
New institutional economics: The Third Way 
New institutional economic (NIE) is characterised by the consensus that countries with 
better institutions trade more, and countries that trade more, develop more. 
Consequently, proper institutions are vital to economic development (Dollar, 2002: 133). 
Similarly, Chang hold economic institutions important as being the central for economic 
development (Chang, 2006: 1). 
 
Moreover, new institutional economics critique the failures of orthodox economic policy, 
which disregard institutions as being significant for economic development. Orthodox 
or neoclassical economics came about in the 19th century and explained efficient 
resource allocation in the developed economies and was therefore not intended to deal 
with issues of developing economies (North, 2003: 1). To exemplify, one immense 
critique is the failure of the structural adjustment programs (henceforth SAPs) in 
developing countries. Initially, supporters of orthodox economic theory argued that 
more extensive policies were needed for SAPs to function. As good results continuously 
did not materialise, its failures were followed by the argument of sufficient time span, 
which was followed by the argument of deficient institutions (Chang, 2006: 1). Although 
the supporters of SAP maintained that the theory was correct, but was handled wrongly 
by poor institutions. The critiques of the SAPs were two folded. It depicts some of the 
failures of orthodox economic theory, as well as it points to the altering discourse of the 
increasingly significant role of institutions in economic development. 
Institutional economics became out-dated because it did not address the issues and 
therefore did not help to improve situations. To understand the correlation between 
institutions and economics, and improve economic development, one ought to know 
what institutions are, “how they work, why they work the way they do” (North, 2003: 1).  
 
Key characteristics and improvements of institutions 
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According to Douglas North, institutions are made up of formal rules, informal norm and 
their enforcement characteristics. The formal rules constitute laws, constitutions and 
regulations, whereas the informal norms constitute the way things are done (North, 
2003: 3). Moreover, institutions exist to reduce uncertainty and create predictability. 
Moreover, institutions are the system that structure human interaction. 
Chang maintains that three key functions of institutions promote economic 
development. First of all, the coordination and administration; second, learning and 
innovation; and third, income redistribution and social cohesion (Chang, 1998b). 
However, as Chang points out, the list is not definitive, and it could moreover contain 
‘investment’, or as proposed by Amartya Sen the ‘development of human capabilities’.  
However, despite the latter definitions, there is a lacking academic consensus of what 
constitutes ‘an institution’. In other words, there is no extensively accepted definition of 
the concept. Institutions thus refer to ‘the rules of the game’ and it refers to ‘the 
organisations’ (Chang, 2006: 2). That is to say, the different forms; democracy, 
independent judiciary, absence of state ownership, and the functions that they perform; 
rule of law, respect for private property, enforceability of contracts, maintenance of price 
stability, and the restraint on corruption, are variables used intertwined and clouds the 
content of the conception (Chang, 2006: 3). In response, it has been argued by some that 
function should be preferred over form, and that “performance or quality”, thus should 
be regarded over form (Aron 2000: 128 in Chang, 2006: 3). 
 
This is exemplified in specific institutions that do not guarantee specific outcomes. 
However, form should not be entirely disregarded, because the form to a certain extent, 
define the function. Nevertheless, current orthodox economic theory emphasise form 
over function as illustrated by the global standard institutions (henceforth GSIs), which 
are perceived as almost universal for existing successfully in globalisation. Chang refers 
to the GSIs as a dangerous “one size fits all” neglect of institutional diversity. These 
constitute: 
 
“political democracy; an independent judiciary; a professional bureaucracy, ideally with 
open and flexible recruitments; a small public- enterprise sector, supervised by a politically 
independent regulator; a developed stock market with rules that facilitate hostile MandA 
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(mergers and acquisitions); a regime of financial regulation that encourages prudence and 
stability, through things like the politically-independent central bank and the BIS (Bank 
for International Settlements) capital adequacy ratio; a shareholder-oriented corporate 
governance system; labour market institutions that guarantee flexibility”   (Chang, 2006: 
4). 
 
Moreover, GSIs are increasingly imposed on unwilling countries through ‘governance -
related conditionalities’ of Bretton Woods institutions and donor governments (Chang, 
2006: 4). 
 
A famous explanation for late developers to catch up with developed economies is the 
Gerschenkronian ‘catching up-model’, which suggests that late developers to import 
already developed institutions. Hereby developing countries make use of better 
institutions without the costs of creating them. This is in part seen as current developing 
countries “enjoy higher standards of political democracy, human rights, and social 
development than developed countries enjoyed at similar level of economic 
development” (Chang, 2006: 11). 
 
North (2003) introduces the ‘adaptive efficiency’ approach. Adaptive efficiency is to 
explain that institutions are generally path dependent. Yet when circumstances and 
experiences in society change and evolve, so must institutions to remain efficient. 
However, institutions can only improve if the alterations resonate with the society and 
norms in question. 
 
Regime type and government credibility 
It goes without saying that regime and government type has an impact on institutions, 
and thus the correlation between institution and economic development. Moreover, 
democracy is to a large extend praised as the best form of governance, hence the 
celebrated ‘good governance model’. However, there is no definite causality between 
regime type and level of economic development. Nevertheless, developed countries 
most often constitute stable democracies while stable democracies in less developed 
countries remain exceptional (Przeworski et al. 1993: 62).  
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Additionally, most developing nations are authoritarian regimes or  single-party 
democracies. Arguably, regime type plays a role in level of development, and especially 
democracy is in many cases a crucial factor. However, the authoritarian regime 
possesses characteristics that enable economic growth and prosperity. State  autonomy 
helps the state apparatus and economy function more efficient and thus improves 
economic output. The key to economic performance is therefore state autonomy, the 
capacity of the state to peruse developmentalist policies with influence from strong non-
state actors enables. Also, the autocratic regime can effectively encourage growth by 
supressing labour unions, wages and consumer demand. Moreover, although conducive 
environments of the authoritarian regime to create great economic output, it is often 
deserted due to policy failure of countless kinds. The authoritarian rule might have less 
interest in maximising output, as it might be more concerned with the current situation 
rather than long-term prosperity of the state (Przeworski et al. 1993: 52 ff). 
 
Initially, private property and universal suffrage was deemed incompatible and 
democracy was therefore not the protector of property as is today. Additionally, Karl 
Marx considered democracy the unchaining of class struggles, where the poor use 
democracy to expropriate riches meanwhile the riches feel threatened and subverts 
democracy by renouncing power to organised armed forces (Przeworski et al. 1993: 52). 
Consequently, democracy and capitalism were seen as incompatible forces of which, one 
of the two ought to crumble. Today, however, democratic rule ensures autonomy and 
property rights and the democratic institutions safeguards that states do not prey on 
society. Although political institutions determine the environment and possibility of 
growth, institutions does not necessarily reflect the political regime but is more 
depended on their character, strength and effectiveness. 
 
The section has presented the advantages and disadvantages of democracy and 
autocracy, and concluded that democracies most often of the two regimes create the 
best economic result. Yet according to Przeworski et al, the neoclassical theory of 
growth has failed to explain the correlation between political regime economic growth, 
and it is therefore uncertain whether democracy foster or hampers it. Policies matter 
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but regimes do not capture the important variances. Therefore, the section concludes 
that regime type has an inconsequential impact on the economic performance, and 
consequently, it is not the type of regime but the level and quality of governance that is 
vital for economic development. Thus, it is seen that regime define government as the 
political structure puts in place the economy. Consequently, politics come before 
economics. 
 
Certain policies are crucial to the creation of economic growth. ‘Property rights’ are vital 
for economic development. When creating economic development, it is important to 
decide which property rights to protect, to what extend and under which conditions 
(Chang, 2006: 8). Also, there is consensus that governments committing to non-
interference in private property rights possess the instruments to obtain long-term 
economic growth (Henisz: 2000: 2). This is because property rights, non-existing 
expropriating risks, and rule of law increase incentives to invest and innovate and 
consequently carry forward economic development (Dollar, 2002: 137). Another 
important factor, in the creation of growth, is contract enforcement and low risk of 
repudiation of contracts by governments. In other words, does the government enforce 
contracts made amongst civil society, and does the government respect its own 
contracts with civil society? However, there are specific functions that institutions ought 
to serve to create economic development, and there are specific institutions doing this 
best, yet, as previously argued by Chang, there is no academic consensus of such list 
either. Lastly, an important factor for creating growth which the project refrain to 
account for is the level of political stability, level of political violence in form of 
revolutions, coups and assassinations. This section, therefore, concludes that the 
credibility of government is essential for the creation of economic growth. 
 
This section has included the neo-liberal and the neo-Marxist perspective on the 
correlation between political institutions and economic growth, as well as it has 
scrutinised new institutional economics. The following will portray both case studies, 
beginning by the Korean case study.   
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Case Studies 
  
South Korea and post-colonial development 
Introduction 
The following part will be about the socio-economic transformation post-colonial period 
in East Asia, particularly South Korea (henceforth Korea) as the key case. 
 
Remarkable economic performance of the four East Asian economies – Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan – after World War II attracted attention all over the world 
with gaudy epithets such as ‘miracle economies’, ‘four Asian tigers’, or ‘four dragons of 
East Asia’. 
 
The Korean situation had been dire after the war; it was one of the poorest nations in 
the 1950s with per capita income less than half those in Ghana and Honduras (Chang, 
2006). Today, Korea, along with other East Asia, has become literally the richest part of 
the world disregarding the old industrial centres of Western Europe and North America. 
Moreover, their achievements were able to build self-sustainable economy. In other 
words, not only the economic growth was advancing, but also their educational 
achievements and other indicators of ‘human development’ have all been impressive. 
 
However, not everything had been rosy; faced with decades of political authoritarianism, 
human rights violations, corruption, repression of labour unions, gender discrimination, 
and so on, have all been problems. Despite its faults, the economy had made good 
progress nation-wise and regional-wise and shown rapid development in 
unprecedented historical standards, which is why we chose South Korea as an example 
of late-developed modern economy. 
 
Taking in the historical perspective, many believe that the East Asia Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) were special cases, to the extent that their rapid 
economic growth is the product of fortuitous historical circumstances, strategic links to 
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the USA, and culturally specific factors. In other words, free riding the economic wave of 
development in Asia. However, our analysis will show that subsequent political and 
policy developments converted such favourable conditions into a process of rapid, self-
sustaining growth. 
 
Historical antecedents 
The Republic of Korea was proclaimed in the South on 15 August 1948, after three years 
of American occupation after the Second World War. US-educated Rhee Syngman 
became the first President of independent Korea.  
 
On June 25, 1950, a war broke out between the North and the South, the Korean War 
(1950-3). Rhee’s government successfully defended South Korea, with the aid of UN 
forces, but this defense was achieved at a terrible cost. The Korean War lasted 3 years, 
decimated approximately 25 percent of the countries’ wealth and entailed the loss of 
over a million lives (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993). 
 
The Rhee government was toppled by student riots in April 1960 – noted as the first 
democratic movement by civil riots. The nation changed its form of government from a 
presidential to a cabinet system, hoping to eliminate authoritarian rule by electing 
Prime Minister Chang Myon in 1960. The Myon government (the Second Republic) was 
abruptly terminated in May 16, 1961 through a military coup d’état led by General Park 
Chung Hee. 
 
Park’s military coup of 1961 marked the beginning of the political involvement of the 
military in Korean society for the next 18 years. Park presided over two republics 
(1963-1979) and is generally credited with paving the way for the Korean economic 
miracle. The early part of the Third Republic (1963-72) did not put much emphasis on 
centralization of political control, but this changed conspicuously with the onset of the 
Fourth Republic (1972-80) with the declaration of Yushin constitution. In October 1972 
Park proclaimed a national emergency in constitution, the national assembly was 
weakened and the bureaucracy strengthened. Various literature studying Park’s 
authoritarian rule and state devised five-year economic plans will be used to evaluate 
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the growth economic development of South Korea. 
 
However, Park’s 18 years of ruling ended with an assassination by the head of the 
Korean Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in October 1979. President Park’s Prime Minister, 
Choi Kyu Ha, was throne as the interim President. However, Choi’s regime lasted for a 
very short period, with incapability to assure political stability and surmounting 
discontent and insecurity among society doubting Choi’s rule. Choi was put down on his 
knees and kicked out as the second coup was brought only a couple of month after. 
 
In December 12, 1979, another coup d’état to take over the South Korean government 
was raised by General Chun Doo Hwan. Chun’s regime (the Fifth Republic, 1980 -7) 
tended to perpetuate the authoritarian features of the Park regime, however, showed no 
significance economic promises. Yet, with the 1988 Olympics and fruit of Park’s 
economic empire showed Koreas economic stability and promising returns riped in the 
Chun regime.  
 
However, the Chun government succumbed to massive protests in June 1987. The 
comprehensive plan for political democratization was announced by Roh Tae Woo, head 
of the Democratic Justice Party, presidential candidate, and right hand man of Chun. Roh 
registered a massive victory in the presidential election – the first ‘democratic’ election 
held. Korea continued hazardous transitions to become a full-scale democratic form of 
government since. 
 
Economic prosperity looked rosy with foundation of labour unions, less discrimination 
and better equality among sexes, higher education, and such; however, Korea could not 
evade the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The Asian financial crisis was more than simple 
macroeconomic mismanagement, but the result of certain deep-rooted institutional 
deficiencies that created moral hazard among its industrial and financial enterprises, 
leading to inefficient investments and excessive risk-taking. 
 
In this sense, the paper will progress to cite cultural heritage and norms and values, 
then move on to evaluate two main periods in the making of economic Korea: first, the 
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rise of Korean economic development and second, how it overcame crisis and manage to 
further develop throughout the 2000s. 
 
 
The Confucian Heritage 
One could argue that cultural and social values represent fundamental historical 
parameters that need to be appreciated as part of understanding the dynamics of 
development. Korea has historically been strongly influenced by the Chinese and 
Confucian values (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993). 
 
There is little doubt that political leaders have periodically invoked Confucianism as a 
means of political and social mobilization. The Confucian value emphasized loyalty to 
the state, filial piety, and harmony – however, it is not a ‘religion stressing an afterlife; it 
is a code of ethics meant to guide the relationships between human beings (O’Mally, 
1998: 322). Korean history long shows the use of Confucian values from as early as 13th 
century of Josun Dynasty for the purpose of political and social mobilization. Likewise, 
scholars are tempted to make connection linking Confucianism and economic success 
(Chowdhury and Islam, 1993). 
 
The Secret Recipe for Korean model 
So one could question, if such historical factors are not enough to bring about a stro ng 
state, what were the deciding factors of Korea’s economic development? Many 
prominent scholars attribute the growth to state intervention in strong charismatic 
leader with well-planned economic plans by top political decision-makers in support of 
active use of export as part of an infant-industry program, skilfully managing domestic 
competition based on productivity, and active policies to promote technology 
absorption (Chang, 2006: 96). 
 
The basic theme of the state intervention in Korea has been the making of an 
‘independent economy’ (Jarip Gyongjae) with decades of Five-year Economic Plans 
(Chang, 2006: 75). Korean policy makers made it key to construct an economy with a 
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degree of technological capability, believing that it would prosper Korea with capital and 
intermediate goods industries. The Korean state had prioritized certain sectors of the 
industry and provided massive support.  
 
The Park regime (1961-79) had been the foundation and the core of the practice of Five-
Year Economic Plans. Korean economic policy-makers of this era emphasized economies 
of scale (building of large corporations), capital accumulation through exporting but 
discouraging import, and “big push” from light industry to develop heavy and chemical 
industry (Haggard and Moon: 76-77). As Park came in power, it came natural to him to 
build political-economic institutions to put the plan forward.  
 
The major theme of domestic economic policy was outlined by successive Five-Year 
Economic Plans, unfolded from the Economic Planning Board (EPB). The First Five-Year 
Plan (1962-66) targeted the basic and light industry. However, the plans did not always 
proceed as Americans in the Agency for International Development (AID) mission did 
not like it, and refused to certify it for foreign lending. Neither was the Second Five-year 
Economic Plan (1967-71) that prioritizing chemical, steel, and machinery. Becoming 
frustrated with the disagreements and rejection of the AID, Park took the five-year plans 
out of the EPB and into the Blue House. 
 
For this reason, radical change in the economy can be seen in the Third and Fourth Five -
year Economic Plan (1972-81), where non-ferrous metal, shipbuilding, and electronics 
were added to the list of the Second Five-Year Economic Plan. The practice continued in 
the fifth and sixth periods (1982-91), during which machinery, electronics, automobile, 
chemical, shipbuilding, and various high-tech industries, such as semiconductor, new 
materials, bio-technology were designated priority sectors (Chang 2006: 81). 
 
To do so, Park, first, had nationalized all the banks to gain control of the financial flows. 
Second, he imprisoned prominent business for illicit wealth accumulation and made a 
deal with them to do business as long as it was state-subsidized, state-designed and 
gave ‘donations’ back to the government. The practice between the government and 
conglomerates led snug ties of win-win strategy (Jwa and Lee, 2000: 64). Third, he set 
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Economic Planning Board (EPB) that had centralized economic policy-making power to 
state bureaucrats (Whang, 1991). In this sense, the regime created a ‘guided capitalism’ 
where the state played the guardian of the economy (Chang, 2006: 97). Under the wings 
of the state, Korea progressed unprecedentedly and Korea met its economic heyday and 
the Miracle of the Han River. 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis and Institutional Changes in Korea 
The Asian financial crisis shows problems of ‘state capitalism’. Asian governments, in 
their attempt to promote their favoured industries, had explicitly and implicitly 
underwritten the investment in them, which naturally encouraged lax management and 
excessive risk-taking. This was special in the case South Korean large conglomerate 
groups, also known as Chaebols. Chaebols took excessive risks knowing that government 
would not risk these businesses to go bankrupt with the fear of economic instability and 
domino – a concept later coined as “too big to fail” (Chang, 2006). 
 
Possibly the most popular variant for the 1997 Asian financial crisis is ‘crony capitalism’, 
when personal connection and political patronage, rather than entrepreneurial abilities, 
determine who gets access to credit and other resources (Chang, 2006). This definition 
goes hand in hand with the concept of chaebol, conceptualized by Woo (1991) “a family-
owned and managed group of companies that exercises monopolistic power or 
oligopolistic control in product lines and industries,” or simply put, Korean 
conglomerates. 
 
A package of policies designated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were forced 
to be adopted to manage the 1997 crisis, which resulted in institutional changes that 
were significant in the nature of Korean economy, yet “still show some traditional 
Korean streaks” (Chang, 2006: 273). The major  structural changes involved; a series of 
legal changes in the financial system. First, the bank’s role in the Korean economy was 
reduced, introduction of BIS standard, reducing chaebols’ debt-equity, and full-scale 
capital accounting, which Jang (2006) conclude was not desirable. 
 
The 1997 financial crisis has been managed in the interests of the financial rentiers 
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(both domestic and foreign). More important are the changes in the institutions of 
corporate governance, financial regulations, and industrial policy, which herald a 
transition to a new economic system (although it is still too early to predict the exact 
shape of things to come).  
 
In short-run perspective, recoveries were not as good as the two recoveries from Oil 
Shocks. In addition, unemployment and income inequality increased in unprecedented 
manner. In long-run perspective, Chang interpreted that the “institutional changes were 
likely to dampen the economy’s investment dynamism by making the financial system 
much more volatile and conservative than before, and consequently making long-term 
patient capital much more scarce” (Chang 2006: 276). 
 
There were certainly some positive aspects in the governance reform program 
implemented since the 1998. For instance, the strengthening of regulations on auditing 
and accounting was important in providing objective and reliable performance 
indicators of companies. In the same vein, it is desirable to strengthen the rights of 
minority shareholders to defend their interests from possible neglect from the 
managers, who tend to cater for the interests of major shareholders. 
 
However, Chang (2006) examines negative aspects on national economy; for example, 
high level liquidity of financial sector leading to increase of non-performing loans, 
constraints on chaebols, which led to fall in borrowing from financial institutions, and 
severe credit crunch by increasing the issuance of stocks and corporate bonds. 
 
Zambia and post-colonial development 
Introduction 
In 1991, Zambia’s founding father, if you may, Kenneth Kaunda and United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) lost the election to the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD). This election broke a period of authoritarian rule in Zambia, a break 
that was meant to start a new era. The UNIP has had presidency since the independence 
from Britain I 1964, and from 1973 been the authoritarian party in Zambia by law. A 
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dominant force in the 1970s and 1980s, UNIP was reduced to a fragile organizational 
shell by the 1990s due to mismanagement by its officials and defections of its 
supporters (Bretton, 1999: 574). During the 1970s, the two oil crisis had taken their toll 
on Zambian economy and the mining industry was hanging by a thread. In the early 
1990s, the labour movement launched Zambia’s pro-democracy movement, and thereby 
steering the transition into multiparty elections, and establishing the MMD. Union 
members encouraged voters to attend opposition rallies, promote candidates, and go to 
the polls, only this time to vote for political change (Bretton, 1999: 573). 
 
To fully grasp the situation in Zambia at the time of the political transition, we will have 
to go back in time and look at the history of the country and the political situation right 
before the independence. In 1958, Kenneth Kaunda broke out of the African National 
Congress (ANC) to fight for independence for Northern Rhodesia. In 1960, he formed 
the party United National Independence Party (UNIP). In 1964, Northern Rhodesia 
broke out of the Central African Federation and gained independence, then changed the 
name of the nation to Republic of Zambia. 
 
Kenneth Kaunda who was the forerunner of the UNIP in the fight for independence was 
known for his “African humanism” that combined Christianity and African tradition and 
values. He was involved in the fight against colonialism and the Central African 
Federation in the late 1950s, which resulted in the split from ANC in 1958. By 
nationalising the copper mines Zambia gained economic prosperity, and was one of the 
wealthiest countries in Sub-Sahara Africa by the mid-1960s. In 1973, Kaunda changed 
the political landscape in Zambia by imposing a one-party system. This led to uprising in 
the public and a lack of trust in the political system, and combined with falling copper 
prices in the international market, it led Zambia into a downward spiral of economic 
decay. 
 
The UNIP was perceived of the nation building party in the following years after the 
independence and the opposition parties did not gain much territory on the political 
agenda (Pettman, 1974: 231). Most of the UNIP leading figures began to see the 
advantages of a one-party system. There were a couple of reasons why Kaunda and the 
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heads of UNIP were concerned with positioning parties. First, due to the tribal and 
regional based parties, the UNIP conceived positioning parties as potential threat to the 
government. Second, the UNIP wanted to eliminate the mobilization of potential enemy 
governments and focus of mobilizing its own people and resources. 
 
Frederick Chiluba, a former union leader, stood as the frontrunner of the Movement for 
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) when it was founded. His vision to end the authoritarian 
rule and insert democracy to benefit the Zambian people was supported by many, 
especially within the labour force. The MMD won a landslide victory in the national 
elections in 1991. In the election, they fought to change the compliant governance of the 
UNIP towards the international investors in the mining industry. However, once in 
power Frederick Chiluba began to follow up on the policies of the previous government, 
resulting in dissatisfaction from many of the MMD members and ultimately the 
resignation of several higher MMD members. In the years after the MMD became more 
authoritarian; thus, the UNIP was banished from participating in the election in 1996. 
This however, created an international roar with anger; Politicians and election 
observers condemning the election accusing the MMD of corruption. Still the MMD won 
the election and Frederick Chiluba remained in power as president until 2001, whe re he 
was forced to resign the post prior to the election.   
 
Cultural Background 
Zambia is a country of many different tribes and languages. At the time of independence, 
Zambia was divided in its loyalty to the government, the ANC, or tribal forces. It was 
difficult for the UNIP to gather the public under one roof, and in its attempts, the UNIP 
came to see regional institutions as problematic and supposedly dangerous to the 
continuance of the independent Republic of Zambia. Many opposing political leader s 
were accused of tribalism and as such, they were accused of favouring their own tribe in 
political matters. This led to even wider national division and even lower support for the 
UNIP. Generally speaking, fragmented party system and divided legislature are believed 
to be highly problematic for the stability of the government where the president is 
elected independently for a fixed term and possesses strong executive powers, as in 
Zambia (Burnell, 2001: 263). This is why Kaunda felt more vulnerable than before and 
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his wish for the UNIP to stay in power became even stronger. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the copper prices fell drastically on the international 
market and the economic uprising that Zambia had only a few years earlier soon 
became a downward spiral. This resulted in higher food prices and agriculture expends, 
and the rising dissatisfaction with the UNIP to pressure President Kaunda even more. By 
1973, Kaunda dissolved the constitution and enforced the one-party state.  
 
Governance of resources 
In 1974, UNIP completely nationalized the Zambian copper mines. Soon after this, the 
international market price on copper fell drastically, and did not fully recover its’ value 
until the turn of the millennium (Fraser, 2010: 2). In the 1960s the “income from the 
mines was used initially to subsidize urban consumers, state-owned companies, and a 
series of Five-Year National Development Plans aimed at developing infrastructure, 
education and health systems” (Fraser, 2010: 6). However, because of the econo mic 
model inherited by the British, most of the profits went through The London Metal 
Exchange (LME). In 1967, Kaunda attempted to make an economic alliance between the 
world’s biggest copper producing nations in order to change the power of the LME. 
However, CIPEC (Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries) was unable 
to organize and police output cutbacks and their status quo power gradually decreased, 
and the organisation never became successful. One of the problems for the CIPEC was 
that the countries involved were poor and did not have the capital it took to stockpile 
copper reserves (central to the management of supply and demand) because of their 
extractive states, inherited by the colonial powers (Fraser, 2010: 7). The fact that 
Kaunda tried to change the distribution of benefits at a global level through CIPEC, 
shows his intentions to follow up on the Five-Year National Development plans. 
 
The fact that Kaunda was unable to succeed, draws the picture of the Zambian plight in 
this period. In 1968, the copper mines were partially nationalised. The Zambian state 
had bought 51% of the shares in the mining industry and formed the ZCCM (Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines). The profits from the mines were big in this period, the 
UNIP made programs supporting the Union members, and providing education and 
health care for those groups (Fraser, 2010: 9). After the first oil crisis in 1973, the 
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copper prices started to fall and Zambia’s economic decline began. The Zambian state 
had taken up loans from bilateral donors to compensate for the decrease in income, and 
when the oil crisis hit, the interests went up and Zambia was suddenly deeply indebted. 
To be able to pay off these debts, the ZCCM was treated as a “cash cow” and milked 
intensively without any following investment in securing the company. “Between 1974 
and 1994, per capita income declined by 50%, leaving Zambia the 25th poorest country 
in the world” (Fraser, 2010: 9). 
 
In 1984, the World Bank (henceforth WB) and the IMF forced Zambia to implement a 
series of structural adjustment programmes. These programmes entailed among others 
laying off civil service staff, public-sector wage cuts, privatisation, and trade 
liberalisation. Between 1991 and 1996 Zambia in turn, got multiple loans from the WB 
and the IMF. Zambia became deeply dependent on aid and this dependency was used to 
ensure that laws in favour of international investors were passed. These laws effectively 
removed the state regulation on the behaviour of companies. As the recession hit in the 
mid-70s, the UNIP was forced to consider liberalisation of the economy under 
supervision from the IMF and the WB. The structural adjustment programmes of the WB 
and the IMF would be imposed during the late 1980s on the Zambian state because of 
the severe debt the country was in. By the end of the 1970s, the recession had severely 
damaged the Zambian economy. Furthermore, Kaunda had problems with the 
population living in the rural areas of the country. Uprisings had sprung up many places 
and the dissatisfaction with UNIP and the structural adjustment programmes were 
intensifying. Especially in the Copperbelt, people were unsatisfied with the state policies,  
and the high prices on food became the catalyst for the Movement for Multi-Party 
System (MMD), and the end of the One-Party State. 
 
The MMD won a landslide victory in 1991, with the support of the unions and their 
resistance to the structural adjustment programmes imposed by IMF and WB. The MMD 
won the election on promising to liberalise the Zambian economy, privatise the state-
owned industries, and secure a new democratic dispensation. However, once in power, 
the MMD kept the trajectory of the UNIP and continued with the structural adjustment 
programmes, even extending them. Because of the transition to multi-party democracy 
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the western donors offered significant financial assistance to make the new political 
authority work. The belief at the end of the Cold War was that a transition from a one-
party socialist system to a multi-party capitalist system would be mutually reinforcing 
for democracy and capitalism (also known as dual transition) (Fraser, 2010: 11). When 
aid started pouring in the state budget became 40% donor dependent. The effect of the 
Dual Transition was accompanied by negative growth rates, deepening debt, and 
increasing poverty (Fraser, 2010: 11). Restrictions of the antidemocratic sort were 
quickly imposed on the civil society and the opposition, because they demanded less 
presidential power. By the second election, the MMD was utterly reduced because of 
leading figures abandoning the party. 
 
The union workers along with other opposing groups rejected the request of the WB 
and the IMF to sell ZCCM in 1992. They believed that selling the mines would result in 
worse conditions for the mineworkers. However, Zambia was at this point deeply 
indebted and qualified for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives (HIPC). HIPC 
was a programme run by the WB and the IMF to help indebted countries overcome their 
debts by debt releases (Fraser, 2010; 12). To be able to access this programme the WB 
and the IMF made it perfectly clear that ZCCM had to be sold. The MMD began the selling 
of the mines in 1997 and by 2000 the mines were on private hands (Fraser, 2010: 12). 
The privatisation of the mines was a great embarrassment to the MMD. The MMD arose 
from the belief that the UNIP were leading bad economic policies, when they were 
elected they attempted to justify unpopular measures as meritorious policies, but after a 
short while they changed policies and defended their economic policies with the 
argument that sacrifices were necessary to gain loans and aid from international donors. 
By the election in 1996, Chiluba had been forced to resign his post as president, leaving 
Levy Mwanawasa as head of the party. There was a strong belief that Mwanawasa was 
the right hand of Chiluba, so the dissatisfaction with the party continued. When the 
private investors two years later withdrew from the mining projects in Luanshya, it left 
an entire community on the breakdown with mass unemployment and unpaid bills and 
pensions. The following years, a strong agreement on the fact that the privatisation had 
failed, unified in the population and opposition groups the nation over. 
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The new investment from 2004 and onwards because of increasing copper prices, gave 
reason for optimism in the country. However, many were still sceptic of the sudden 
reinvestment in the mining industry. Fear that international investors might pull out 
again made people not trust in the institutions that were to secure their rights.  When 
the ZCCM was first sold off in the mid-1990s, the employment in the mines fell from 
45000 to nearly 22000 when at its lowest (Fraser, 2010: 14). Many international 
investors took advantage of the weak unions (after the terrible election for MMD), and 
the non-enforced employments laws. 
 
However, this increase in the international market had a different ground set than in the 
1960s. This time a very different global ideological context became the backbone of 
investing in the underdeveloped country. The free market that emerged from the 
liberalisation process now claimed that the private-sector companies and the 
governments should work together to reduce poverty. The principal responsibility for 
the new mining owners was to re-invest in the community to revitalise the regional 
economy, to generate employment for workers and a market for local producers. The 
role of the state in this aspect is to generate low-tax economy, health and safety, and 
environmental laws (Fraser, 2010: 15). By generating prosperity and re-investing that 
prosperity in welfare, the possibility of poverty reduction is thus greater. 
 
The problem for the Zambian government was that it was too focused on keeping the 
companies satisfied, and the companies’ demands resulted in policies that were working 
against the needs of the civil society. The Zambian state was so desperate to secure 
international investors that they negotiated a list of bad deals with the companies in 
terms of taking over ZCCM. These deals entailed among others tax incentives and the 
exemption from national laws that again made the companies able to stand away from 
having to pay pensions to employees. The new companies took advantage of the 
possibility to make a good deal with the Zambian government, and ended up paying next 
to nothing in taxes. This came to have serious effect on the communities in the 
Copperbelt. If the tax rates were low, then the income in the country were low and with 
that result no welfare was affordable and the since the companies had resigned from 
liabilities for the workers in the mines, they now received nothing from either state or 
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employer. This resulted in the increase of poverty. The money from the mines was 
expatriated before Zambians even explored the benefits of the economic “boom”. 
 
Secrecy around the Development Agreements did not help the government much either. 
The regulating authorities that were supposed to keep the companies to their promises 
did not even know the agreements and their terms. This made it easy for the companies 
to argue that their business was to conduct mining and not to secure social rights and 
infrastructure. The secrecy around the Development agreements meant that the 
companies could actually deny having agreed to certain terms since no one knew the 
exact agreements (Fraser, 2010: 16). 
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Analysis 
 
South Korea 
Introduction 
The following section analyse the Korean case in reflection of the book Bringing the 
State Back in by Theda Skocpol, Peter B. Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer and also the 
Developmental State by Meredith Woo-Cumings et al., focusing on the state and its 
remarkable economic development during the Park Chung Hee regime (1961-79). 
 
In the first-half of the twentieth century, Korea had been in a dire situation in economy 
politics after thirty-five years of colonial domination by Japan (1910-45) and the Korean 
War (1950-53). On the contrary, in the latter half of the century, Korea began to turn 
leaves; successions of efficient and well-planned Five-Year Economic Plans have 
highlighted economic development in South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 
contemporary, Korea is recognized as a middle-income nation in 2000 (Chang, 2006) 
and earned its place in the OECD in 1996. Not just economic development has been 
significant, other social factors, such as the human development, have all been very 
impressive. 
 
The factors behind the engine of Korean economic growth can be studied through 
Bringing the State Back In and the Developmental State. In the latter part of the analysis, 
project will take a look at additional factors that would help understand and analyse the 
importance of ‘state’ in Korean more important. 
 
Analysing Korea through Bringing the State Back in and the Developmental State 
As mentioned in the literature review, Bringing the State Back in focuses on the 
importance of ‘states’ to lead and influence policy and society after World War II; but 
only when it has capitalist orientation within the political agenda. In addition, 
intervention empowers state; however, the consequences can be ambivalent and is seen 
as to be potentially both positive and negative. In the case of Korea in the sixties and 
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seventies, it is commonly accepted that the former outweighed the latter. 
 
Evans and Rueschemeyer emphasizes, state intervention is crucial for the economic 
development. And it was the exact case for development in Korea, which strong state 
intervention bringing fruit to sudden economic soars in the 1960s and 1970s. Like -
minded Korean bureaucrats were efficient in mobilizing and establishing economic-
efficient administration with the capability to sustain capital accumulation and reach 
higher levels of productivity. In this sense, collectively-oriented administrative was 
rational path of strategy for the late developmental state; Korea. 
 
Here are four main criteria Evans and Rueschemeyer asserted in the chapter ‘The Sta te 
and Economic Transformation’: collective and rational bureaucrats, collection and 
redistribution of income, centralization and decentralization of institutions, and state 
owned enterprises (SOEs); collaborated with Evans’ other chapter on transnational 
linkages. Chalmers Johnson adds to this, that for the developmental state to thrive, a 
weak and subordinate civil society is needed. The aim of analysis is to see Korea’s 
economic strategy and test the relative autonomy state theory and its capabilities.  
 
Most of Evans and Rueschemeyer’s criteria can be perceived in the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB), an institution organized in 1961 to implement economic plans and 
formulate industrial policy. In addition to EPB, other related examples will be used to 
elaborate the analysis. First, the bureaucrats of Korea alleged educated state managers 
were most capable at running state economy; thus making of elitist bureaucrats and 
institutions. EPB is a great example of collective group of ‘adequate bureaucrats’ who 
had directed rational economic plans, namely Five-Year Economic Plans; because it was 
the bureaucrats who understood the state’s abilities and were best able to implement 
relevant and sufficient policies through information gathering organization and 
‘distribution’. 
 
Second, in relation to distribution, the rise of middle class in Korea shows that the 
labour-intensive industry and export performance has proved itself; the changing 
phases of the industry created open space for employment of factory workers. Not only 
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men, but many women were employed and were encouraged to work for the first time. 
Economic prosperity improved the distribution of income and thus, higher levels of GDP 
per capita; naturally leading to enhanced levels of living standard. In this sense, the state 
management of collection and redistribution of income created improved society 
standards for commoners. 
 
Third, EPB is also a good example of state practice of centralization and decentralization. 
In the beginning, the organization was arranged under the Blue House; as state in the 
centre. However, with the intervention of the United States diplomats and rejection to 
‘irrational’ economic plan, President Park took the EPB out of the Blue House as a 
separate organization. However, instead of having complete separated dual relationship 
with potential conflicting interests, the state was able to influence the group toward an 
objective and a group of economists would push forward economic plans based on the 
goal. In other words, planning was for the centre and control of resources for 
decentralized agencies in order to achieve coordination. 
 
An additional explanation to the syncing relationship between the state and the EPB 
could be in the long practice of Confucianism, where hierarchy was widely accepted and 
commonly practised. Other examples of efficient centralization were the banks which 
were nationalized and the agricultural cooperatives which were also put under the 
control of the agricultural bank. Centralizing the banks was an important strate gy as 
foreign loans could be wielded to increase the autonomy and influence the state. It is no 
longer dependent on private domestic elites as its sole source of resources. In addition, 
loans are important source of capital for local industrialists attempting to implement 
their own private projects – which illustrates our next criteria; the relationship between 
chaebol – Korean conglomerates – and the Park regime.  
 
The fourth criterion is the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In developing nations, 
market could reflect mercantile pursuits. In the early years of his regime, Park had 
originally thought to imprison fattened businessmen who made a lot of money on the 
courtesy of President Rhee Syngman (the first republic: 1948-60) as ‘illicit profiteers’ 
(Cumings, 2005). Chief among them was Yi Byong-chol, chairman of Samsung, who 
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suggested to President Park that the businessmen should be encouraged to seek foreign 
capital to get the economy moving. Park took in Yi’s proposal and called in major 
business leaders to make an agreement to invest money in new industries granting 
preferential access to raw materials and favourable credit in return for donating “shares” 
to the government. Not long after, Park announced a program of “heavy and chemical 
industrialization,” with steel, autos, ships, and machines projected to be main export, 
rather than light industries (Brazinsky: 149). In this sense, Park’s decision to push 
ahead on heavy industrialization further necessitated a highly centralized power 
structure for corporate enterprises and as central to the developmental state; the state 
began to intervene in the private market to secure economic development. 
 
An example of state-pushed heavy machine investment was the Changwon Machine 
Building Industrial Complex in the harbour of Masan. The selection of geography 
seemed to be worst misallocation of resources in the eyes of foreign economists, since 
Japan had been building a big lead in global machine tools. Nevertheless, Park had 
pushed his way because he desired industrial sovereignty. To make it come true, he 
herded all the big firms into Changwon, building more than a hundred factories and 
“Changwon took off like a rocket” (Cuming, 2006: 90). Consequently, Korea is regarded 
as a developmental state. 
 
Cumings (2005) notes, “the period from 1965 to 1971 was one of rapid economic 
growth and comparative political stability.” In this sense, Evans argues effective 
bureaucratic machinery as key to the state’s capacity to intervene and the Park 
government effectively pursued the role of guidance, if not effective control, which was 
crucial to Korean business and economy. The guidance held two main aspects: the need 
to develop a consistent and coherent manner and the capability to push forward 
country-specific program through the four criteria mentioned above.  
 
Additional Attributions 
In this section, the project will briefly rebut the theories that disregard the state as the 
engine of the growth, but rather Korean economic as free riders of general economic 
boom in Asia. These groups scholars reject the core notion of Bringing the State Back In 
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or the Developmental State – state policies as effective developments strategy – but 
rather internal factors, such as the cultural background of values and norms, or exterior 
factors as the product of Japanese modernization trickling down and colonial 
inheritance; American Occupation (1945-48) and its aid; and consequences of rapid 
economic development; the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Confucian/cultural heritage 
Some scholars attribute Korean cultural values and norms, mainly the practise of 
Confucianism, as a possibility of the success. However, Little (1979: 463) notes ‘cultural 
factors cannot be more than contributory factors, which may play their part, but only 
when other conditions are favourable.’ Likewise, there are several analytical flaws to 
emphasizing Confucianism as a major contributor to economic prosperity. First, specific 
cultural factors are unnecessary as East Asia’s economic growth and institutions, as it 
can be explained in terms of general economic principles. Second, it is difficult to 
suggest that the organization of family-oriented firms with long-term employer-
employee relationship is the key to Korean success. In fact, inefficiency by promoting 
workers by age and durability in the company created inefficiency and lagging 
motivation to work harder but stick longer. And as indicated above in a developmental 
state, Korean industries pushed for efficiency and states would drop subsidy by the level 
of productivity. Third, Confucianism has been around for centuries, yet East Asian 
success began in the 1960s. Lastly, North and South Korea had the same culture when 
they were divided but very different institutional structures were created in the South. It 
is of course not culture that explains South Korea’s success but institutions. 
 
All these explanations conclude that cultural factors did not bring economic prosperity. 
Yet, the practices could have furnished what was the product of the state. In this sense, 
Chowdury and Islam (1993) define clearly that we must not over-emphasize the effect 
of Confucianism as core to economic prosperity; but rather as a consequence of 
developmental state. 
 
Consequences of Japanese Colonialism 
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Another point taken in account is the aftermath of colonial development. Initially, Korea 
was used as agricultural source for Japan. It was not until the 1930s when major efforts 
toward industrialization took place to aid Japan with weaponry for the second Sino -
Japanese War (1937-45) and spreading of its colonies. Some scholars argue that such 
infrastructure became the benchmark of modernization in Korea. In addition, the 
Japanese colonial state built an innovative transportation; train and railways that pass 
through the peninsula, as well as substantial investment in health and primary 
education. 
 
However, the efforts of the Japanese colonial state to industrialise Korea were the results 
of an objective not in the interest of Korean development but of exploitation and to aid 
their self-sufficiency. Similarly, Ho (1984: 368-9) argues that “the colonial sectors had 
developed not according to their comparative advantages but rather to meet specific 
Japanese needs.” It is clear that the industrial structures the Japanese have left behind 
were inefficient and thus not the basis upon which one could build the export-oriented 
manufacturing revolution of the 1960s. Moreover, the industrial base of the Japanese 
period hardly remained, given the destruction of the World War II, the splitting up of 
Koreas and the calamities of the Korean War. Especially in the case of the South, as most 
of Japanese industry base and electric power plant were built in the North. To conclude, 
the colonial era brought about economic prosperity; however, were forms of extractive 
institutions to sustain Japanese industry rather than internal development. Thus, the 
theory on Japanese colonialism modernizing Korea becomes a paradox of growth 
without institutional development. 
 
American Occupation and American Aid 
There is an enduring belief that the East Asian NIEs benefited from the US perception of 
the region and that the USA used its aid leverage to reinforce the position of pro -
American elites and to cement strategic ties with economic ties. It is alleged that these 
geopolitical realities go a long way towards an understanding of the dynamism of the 
region. The outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula extended the Cold War to Asia, 
altering United States’ strategic perception of the region and creating expanded political 
and economic commitments in Korea with influx of massive aid in the 1950s and 60s. 
 54 
 
However; Little (1979: 456-9) notes that the aid had already tapered off by the early 
1960s, at which point other countries became more significant recipients of American 
aid and the attention on Korea has shifted off to another; for example, Vietnam. 
Therefore, despite the important contribution; it could not be taken as a sufficient 
condition for Korea’s superior economic performance. In addition, many aid recipients 
tend to fall into the aid dependency syndrome; however, Korean bureaucrats must be 
given credit not only staying away from the honey-trap but also efficiently making its 
own self-sufficient economy. 
 
Vietnam War as the Start-off of Korean Economy 
One factor taken in by many scholars as the key to Korea’s prosperity and initial 
development in its industry is the Vietnam War. Woo (1991: 97) analyses that the 
Vietnam War acted as “an incubator of new industries before testing the fires of 
international competition.” The businessmen of these industries subsequently became 
the leaders of the 1970s and 1980s. In this sense, the Vietnam War became the debut for 
Korean firms to gain experience in international construction projects by undertaking 
large-scale construction. 
 
Likewise, the Vietnam War could be considered as accidental chance for Korean 
development. However, in the case of Korea, this luck was an event that could be taken 
with sustained industrialization with the initiative and enterprise to exploit the 
advantage. As the proverb goes, “luck is where preparation meets opportunity.” 
 
Incapability of the State during the Asian Financial Crisis 
Many attribute the Asian Financial Crisis to the archetypal power-strong state and its 
crony capitalists as the cause of the crisis. On the contrary to this popular belief, Chang 
argues that strong state intervention is not the cause of the crisis. First, the author 
contends that from the Kim Young Sam administration from 1993, the “government has 
dismantled industrial policy, except for Research and Development (R&D) support in 
some high-technology industries (Chang, 2006: 188). Meaning, it was no longer in 
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charge of the head-strong industrial policy where state managed the economy effectively. 
Second, the Korean government was willing to pull off support for those industries that 
lagged behind. In other words, there was little room for crony capitalists and moral 
hazard as government support was contingent only under the circumstance that the 
chaebols shown progress. “Therefore, it is difficult to blame the Korean crisis on 
industrial policy as it was not around anymore in any meaningful way” (Chang, 2006: 
247). 
 
In this sense, Chang goes further and conclude that it was the demise of industrial policy, 
rather than its continuation, which was mainly responsible for the 1997 crisis in Korea. 
He supports this with the official end of state planned five-year economic after three 
decades in 1993. The disappearance of ‘rational’ government led growth had paved way 
for cronyism to proliferate (Chang, 2006: 189). 
 
All in all, the analysis examined how state was the innovator of successful economic 
development in Korea. The first section tested the general concepts the developmental 
state theory provided. The latter section was focused on challenging the view that the 
Korean miracle economy was largely the product of incidental historical events and as 
an exclusive case to be studied separately from sense of general development.  
 
It is of no doubt that development is a combination of endogenous and exogenous 
factors, and to some extent, the extra-variables that point reason for elsewhere may be 
true, we cannot solely regard them as the core of Korea’s economic development. This 
analysis is to prove that economic development is a political constructed process, 
carried out by governmental bureaucrats and technocrats. As underscored in the two 
books – Bringing the State Back in and The Developmental State – the state is still the 
core; good strategic policies help foster economic development. Consequently Korea has 
experienced high and sustainable economic growth due to the implementation and 
policies of being a developmental state.  
As the former investigated the impressive economic growth of Korea, the following 
section will investigate the Zambian economic development, to compare and contrast 
different trajectories of political institutions of economic growth. 
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Zambia 
Introduction 
In analysing Zambia and the current situation, looking at the status of the institutions 
from the time of independence to present day is important. To analyse the specific 
institutions the project will examine the important eras from gaining independence to 
forming a one-party-state and on to forming a multi-party-state. These eras will be 
investigated in the light of the theory of Acemoglu et al.  
Once the status of the institutions; the political institutions, the prospect of economic 
growth and the external factors, influencing the government policies are accounted for 
during history, one can look at the current state of the nation. 
The project takes into account that much depends on the way political institutions 
operate within the country, especially whether they reinforce or break with practices 
inherited from the past, when investigating the political life in Zambia after 
independence. 
 
Political institutions during the UNIP 
At the time of independence, Zambia inherited a system of institutions unfit for 
development. These institutions were set up by the British to extract resources from the 
country, but not invest in development of the nation or economic growth. The new 
government was left with no instruments adequate for implementation of  its policies. As 
the copper prices were low in the end of the 1960s, the UNIP had no capital to 
implement the Second National Development Plan. This meant a huge reduction in 
government expenditure and no investment in the rural areas, i.e. the politically fragile 
Copperbelt (Pettman, 1974: 233). The political institutions had indeed survived from 
the colonial rule, and were starting to eat into the development of the nation. The 
general dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to distribute resources in a 
politically effective way, made the support for the UNIP decrease critically. By the 
beginning of the 1970s, the support for the party was so fragile that Kaunda felt 
compelled to invoke a one-party system in the country, to stay in seat as president.  
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According to Acemoglu et al. the colonising powers did not build the institutions with 
the intend of developing a nation and after de-colonisation the institutions remained in 
the shape of extractive institutions that were concentrated around central planning. 
However, as Acemoglu et al. states, central planning is not efficient for generating 
development and economic growth. It is interesting that the electoral system, borrowed 
from colonial times, is a factor common to all three republics of the UNIP (Burnell, 2001: 
248), when the status of the country is so very different in the three republics.  
 
Another important feature of political life in Zambia - one with pre-colonial origins - 
that has shaped the parties and the party landscape through the years is neo-
patrimonialism (Burnell, 2001: 251). It influences the ruling party's ability to reinforce 
its position, it allows wealthy individuals to create their own parties or political groups, 
and it enhances the centralization of power within parties. This accentuates the 
advantages of presidential rule over the dispensation of powers formally provided for in 
the republic's constitution (Burnell, 2001: 251). The fact that the majority of the 
political power lay with the president, assured the fact that the republic would endure. 
When Kaunda inflicted the One-Party State, he ultimately took power of the political 
institutions in the country, and according to Burnell (2001: 260), “politicians obviously 
carry with them lessons and experiences from the past”. 
 
It is clear that the institutions in Zambia during the first years of independence were 
inherited by the colonial powers. In the middle and the end of the 1960s, copper prices 
were high and Zambia had a steady growing economy. By the end of the 1960s, th ey had 
advanced to one of the richest countries in the Africa, but in spite of their wealth the 
UNIP did not invest the income in the human capital, and they did not secure civil rights, 
such as property rights, and non-expropriation laws. Instead of re-investing in the 
country, they treated the copper mines as “cash cows” in order to gain larger profits. 
These depraved policies resulted in the country’s steep economic fall during the 1970s, 
when the oils crisis hit. By the 1980s, Zambia was heavily dependent on aid, and was 
forced to lead policies chosen by donor institutions, in order to retain capital from the 
international society. The extractive institutions of the colonial reign had survived well 
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into the new regime. 
 
Zambian political institutions during the MMD 
According to Acemoglu et al., ”the reason why African countries are poorer is not due to 
cultural or geographic factors, but mostly accounted for by the existence of worse 
institutions in Africa.” (Acemoglu et al., 2000: 22). This statement is relevant when 
looking at the trajectory of the MMD. Although, where new regimes emerged 
authoritarian tendencies persisted, as the case of Chiluba’s MMD victory in the election 
of 1991 (Nasong’o, 2007: 83-84). During the election campaign, the MMD went to the 
polls on liberalising the Zambian economy, privatise state-owned industries and secure 
a new democratic dispensation (Fraser, 2011). However, once in power, the MMD 
followed the trajectory of the UNIP with regards to the SAPs, and though the IMF and the 
World Bank hailed the fast process of the privatisation of national companies it was 
accompanied by a great looting of national fiscus, negative growth rates, deepening debt, 
and increasing poverty. This trajectory generated civil uprising, demanding that Chiluba 
reduced the power of the presidency, which he refused (Fraser, 2011). The fact that 
Chiluba refused the demands of the public and instead invoked undemocratic sanctions 
correlates with the main argument of Acemoglu et al. and the fact that institutions are 
inherited from regime on to regime. In regards to this, Jeffrey Sachs argues that 
democracies are a volatile term that changes from republic to republic. Even though the 
type of regime changed, the persistence of the authoritarian ruler continued, as 
suggested by Acemoglu et al. in their theory on the persistence of institutions.  
 
The MMD did establish a strong union group, which emphasised the democratic rights 
of the people, but as Nasong’o remarks, “where new regimes emerged, authoritarian 
tendencies persisted” (Nasong’o; 2007). To exemplify, Chiluba himself was a former 
union leader; however, once in power he was no longer the “man of the people” but a 
president; the power of that title meant power over the country. Nasong’o also 
emphasises that democratisation entails redesigning governance institutions in order to 
make them take into account the changes in the political landscape (Nasong’o; 2007), 
changes such as falling copper prices, increasing poverty and growing national debt – all 
three the case for Zambia. Nasong’o also emphasises the imperative need for 
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accountable government decision-making institutions, in order to be able to achieve 
democracy. The MMD had long lost the accountability, and liberal democracy seemed 
distant. 
 
Chiluba seemed to become more authoritarian the more objections surfaced from both 
within the party but also from the rural areas, which clashes with the original 
perspective of the MMD, namely, to be the beginning of the Multi-Party Democracy. 
When the MMD close to the election in 1996 banned the possibility for the UNIP to run 
for presidency, they ultimately nailed their own coffin as fighters for democracy. Even 
though privatisation had proven unreliable in the past, the World Bank and the IMF 
insisted on making government sell the ZCCM in order to implement Zambia in the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries programme (HIPC) that would initially release the 
country for parts of its debt. This correlates with the neoliberal strategy posed by the 
IMF and the World Bank in the beginning of the millennium. As La Porta et al. notice, 
those in power create institutions to stay in power and amass resources (La Porta et al., 
1998).  
 
The new ideology of the IMF and the World Bank 
Exogenous factions affect the institutions in the state. When looking at the Zambian 
government during the rule of UNIP, the institutions used then were clearly affected by 
the colonial powers and the extractive institutions that they set up. Nevertheless, the 
IMF and the World Bank are influential on the conditions and regulations of weak 
institutions, a case in point, the Zambian government. The requirements of these major 
international institutions affect the possibility of the current Zambian government to 
actually negotiate a profitable deal with international private investors. 
 
As Fraser et al. argues a new era had occurred in the mid-2000s, within a very different 
global ideology from the one in the 1960s. The new ideology emphasised that the 
private-sector companies and the government should work in partnership to deliver 
poverty reduction (Fraser, 2011). The mine-owners and the government each had 
specific responsibilities in order to make cooperation further economic growth. The key 
institutions of the investors would be revitalising the regional economy by investing 
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capital, and generating employment for workers and a market for locals. The key 
institutions for the government would be to provide the enabling environment meaning 
low tax economy, and regulation of labour, health and safety. If this be accomplished the 
population should be able to hold the two parts accountable for their different liabilities 
(Fraser, 2011). If democracy involves mass political participation political institutions 
must be readily available to link citizen and state (Bretton, 1999: 582). As La Porta et al. 
argues (1998: 10), for the institutions to perform better they would have to let go of the 
extractive policies and change into inclusive institutions that would benefit a bigger 
group of people, not just a small group of elite, and thereby benefit the country. As long 
as the small elites have the power over the institutions, there is small chance of 
changing the structure of the institutions. 
 
The problem occurs, once more, with the weak institutions. The Zambian government 
negotiated the Development Agreements, as they were keen to oblige to the investors’ 
terms in expense of securing environment of the population. The Development 
Agreements were institutions made by the IMF and the World Bank in order to make 
sure that the Zambian government did everything possible to attract foreign investors to 
be able to gain economic revenue. The problem with the Development Agreements was 
that their terms were kept secret from the public. Neither trade unions, Members of 
Parliament nor regulating authorities were aware of the contents of the agreements, 
thus could not hold the government accountable for their liabilities. When the investors 
could not be held accountable for their liabilities to the public, the government was 
expected to step in and provide the necessary means for the workers and the population 
in the rural areas. This is where Acemoglu et al. emphasises the weak institutions as the 
answer to the non-existing economic growth. However, it is interesting to see how 
external factors also play a crucial role in the possibility of economic growth. The IMF 
and the World Bank commanded specific demands to be kept in order for the Zambian 
government to be able to obtain debt releases. Debt release was a crucial factor in the 
Zambian economy, but so were investors and the capital they ought to bring into the 
country. 
 
The specific case of tax collection 
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The collection of taxes is usually the institutions that form the financial basis of all other 
institutions to perform on. When taxes are not gathered, it is not only to do with Sub-
Sahara Africa’s poor socio-economic state, but also the general inability of the 
government to collect them. According to Von Soest (2007: 622), this is due to, what he 
calls neo-patrimonialism. He agrees with Acemoglu et al. in so far as the institutions are 
inherited from the former colonial powers of the specific countries, in the case of 
Zambia, Britain. However, Von Soest also emphasises the importance of the relations 
between Zambia and their donors. The donors, in the case of Zambia, have great control 
over the political institutions. Since they are the ones to insert capital in the declining 
economy, they expect certain results from the government, also known as the 
Development Agreements. If these agreements are formed on distorted grounds with 
the government giving in on demands, then that proves the weakness of the political 
institutions and the inability to generate economic growth. It has been seen so far that 
weaknesses in institutional capacity can create obstacles to participation in the 
democratic process. Furthermore, groups of elites who were socialized into the political 
framework during an authoritarian rule may continue after this, to deploy the political 
institutions to control public involvement (Bretton, 1999: 550). In reality, the 
consolidation of new democracies in poor countries is likely to be decreased by endemic 
institutional shortcomings in political and civil society: New ruling groups use powers of 
term to assert party dominance, opposition political parties remain fragmented and 
underfunded, and voluntary associations sometimes encourage narrow sectarian 
identities rather than universal norms of citizenship. Under these circumstances, state 
elites who feel the urge to control and limit democratic participation will inherit, in 
countries like Zambia, a conducive institutional system (Bretton, 1999: 582). 
 
Sub-Conclusion of the Analysis 
According to the Developmental State theory, the state must be at the centre 
orchestrating economic transformation. In order to do so, state must recruit adequate 
bureaucrats, collect and redistribute of revenues, centralize and decentralise 
institutions, and get involved in state owned enterprises (SOEs) to direct the economy 
toward efficiency. The analysis using the Korean way to develop, especially using the 
example of the central economic planning board (EPB), is not only able to prove the 
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developmental theories, it was also able to shot down factors that contradict the theory 
and also strengthened the theory. All in all, through the analysis, Korean economic 
development in the 1960s and 1970s seem very fit to prove the development state 
theory; economic development is a politically constructed process. 
 
In Zambia however, the extractive institutions set up by the colonial powers remained 
after independence. These institutions were designed to extract resources from the 
country to its colonial power. In the years following independence, the Zambian copper 
mines made a huge profit, which made Zambia rise to the status of middle-income 
country. The problem for Zambia was the fact that these institutions were not made to 
build the nation and so the Zambian government did not invest in the nation. After the 
fall of the copper prices, the country became deeply dependent on aid, and loans from 
the IMF and the World Bank. This meant that the Zambian government had to privatise 
the mines in order to gain debt releases from donors, and in negotiating with foreign 
investors, the government once again did not take into account to secure the Zambian 
population against expropriation or to negotiate liabilities for the investors. 
 
The following section will discuss the two case studies, as well as neo -Marxist and neo-
liberalism; explaining the link between political institutions and economic growth. 
Additionally, the role of regimes as well as the world system analysis it will be discussed. 
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Discussion 
 
Resource Curse Theory 
As mentioned in the analysis, the two countries began their political trajectories 
differently and thus took dissimilar paths in the road to economic prosperity and 
economic development. In the case of Korea, a developmental state, President Park led 
the country into economic prosperity by state-led development hence political 
interference in the market. In Zambia, however, the government never initiated state-led 
development. During the first republic of the UNIP Zambia saw a great increase in 
economic growth; the nationalized mines were producing vastly and the copper market 
was profitable. During the Rhee regime, Korea did not foresee much economic 
prosperity due to the Korean War and the reliance on American Aid. However, with the 
takeover by President Park, Korea’s economy escalated with successive economic plans 
of state built infrastructure as well as investment in human capital. 
 
This was not the case in Zambia; the UNIP treated the mines as “cash cows” and did not 
manage to invest the revenue in a sustainable source of income. Clearly, Zambia did not 
make use of the state led interference to create economic growth and cannot be 
regarded a developmental state. To avoid being contra factual, the discussion will avoid 
debating the potential role of the strategy but will rather discuss why Zambia 
maintained an unsustainable economic source of economy. This will be discussed by 
including the perspective of the resource curse theory. 
 
The resource course argues, that countries with high degree of natural r esources are 
prone to focus their economy around resources rather than developing sustainable 
sources of economic income. This is supported by our cases. In Korea, a small group of 
elitist bureaucrats led the state institutions the way they saw fit and since Korea did not 
have natural resources, it was a necessity for the state-led institutions to invest in the 
nation. In order to do so, they developed inclusive institutions to make the necessary 
policies. Zambia on the other hand, possessed resources, yet ended up not creating a 
sustainable source of income in times of economic boom. Zambia had, as a result of its 
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extractive institutions and ‘the resource course’, become dependent on aid. Arguably, the 
resource course serves as an explanation of why Zambian power holders failed to build 
a sustainable source of economic institution. 
 
Korea, on the other hand, needed to build sustainable sources of economic institutions 
in order to gain economic growth. The creation of inclusive institutions thus came from 
the necessity and a wish to develop, by the authoritarian leader, Park. Park had a 
military background and was thus power-driven and efficiency focused. Consequently, 
he focused the economy around heavy industry and made steal the symbol of the nation. 
He made sure that the revenue Korea made from light industry went into strengthening 
the state and building of machinery for starting the heavy industry. Korea received aid 
from the U.S., but because that aid also went into building stronger institutions and as 
start-capital for the market on heavy industry, Korea did not let itself fall into the aid 
dependency syndrome. 
 
The role of regime in economic development  
To be able to invoke sustainable sources of economic institutions, Korea needed a strong 
political head of state, similar to central planning. According to Acemoglu et al., central 
planning in the eyes of economic growth is not efficient. However, the latter is somewhat 
disproved by Korean central planning as it showed efficient. 
 
After the invoking the one-party system, Kaunda turned Zambia into an authoritarian 
regime. However, due to the insufficient economic institutions, as well as the resource 
course, it did not lead to economic prosperity as it had in the developmental state Korea.  
 
Acemoglu et al. discussed that the central planning is inefficient in regards to economic 
growth. However, the authors generalise when arguing that central planning is 
inefficient in building economic institutions. It is inefficient because a small elitist group 
refuse to improve institutions because of their own gains from the resource industry.  
 
Acemoglu et al. suggests indirectly through their analysis of political institutions that 
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there are two ways a country can go in terms of statehood; one is the liberal capita list 
notion, the other the socialist communist notion. Acemoglu et al. does not take the 
‘middle road’, into account namely the state-led economic growth. This middle road 
between the capitalist liberal view and the communist view is a somewhat semi state-
regulated interference in the market, proved efficient in bringing economic development, 
especially in the case of late developing economies. Therefore, central planning worked 
in Korea with the developmental state but not in Zambia as it is not a developmental 
state. 
 
Contrary to the Western popular belief as democracy being the most beneficial regime, 
the project has contested the correlation between regime and economic growth. It did 
so theoretically, as Przeworski as well as Sachs maintain that certain autocratic 
characteristics such as state autonomy, benefits autocratic leaders in decision-makings. 
For autocratic states, economic growth thus depends on the willingness and abilities of 
the leader to make institutions suitable for economic development.  
 
Moreover, the project depicted this empirically. It revealed that the sustainable source of 
growth in Korea was achieved while Korea was under autocratic rule. At the same time, 
the project showed that the democratic republic of Zambia did not manage to create a 
sustainable economic growth. Arguably, the project finds that there is no correlation 
between type of regime and level of economic development. Although developed 
countries most often constitute stable democracies and stable democracies in less 
developed countries remain exceptional, the latter has to do with other factors than 
political regime. Accordingly, The analysis illustrated that the abilities to create 
economic growth is thus not dependent on the political regime, but rather on the quality 
of institutions out in place by the government. 
 
Changing places within the global economic system 
According to neo-Marxist, countries can change places within the global economic 
system if they are able to change economy from conduction of low skill work to high 
skill work, and vice versa, and they have the financial abilities and the knowhow to do so. 
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However, changes rarely occur, as such shifts take time to be ripe visible results. 
Interestingly, both case studies analysed in this project has moved from one area of the 
global economy to another.  
 
As stated previously, Zambia moved from a middle-income country by the time of 
independence, in this framework regarded as a semi-periphery country, to a periphery 
country within two decades. This happened due to endogenous as well as exogenous 
factors. The falling copper prices followed by two oil crises left its marks on the Zambian 
economy. During the time of economic prosperity Zambia did not manage to create a 
sustainable source of economic institution and the economy was continuingly based on 
resource extraction, mainly in the copper mining sector. In the short time Zambia was a 
semi-periphery country, it did not manage to innovate its economy to conduct high skill 
work and encompass advanced and complex economic activities needed for a country to 
move towards the core or to sustain its position as a semi-periphery. Therefore, when 
the development negotiations were implemented, the national tax collecting capacity 
became ineffective and Zambia retreated to the periphery and became further trapped 
within. Arguably, Zambia’s change of position was counter-productive of the countries 
hope of economic development and due to lack of capital and innovative skills; the 
prospects are not likely to improve in the near future. 
 
Also Korea has changed position within the global economic system of Immanuel 
Wallerstein. However, contrary to Zambia, Korea began as a periphery country and 
moved its way towards the semi-periphery. In the 1960s, during Zambia’s heyday as the 
semi-periphery, Korea was considered one of the poorest countries in the world, due to 
the harsh Korean War, which shattered the existing colonial institutions. Korea was thus 
placed in the periphery of the world system. However, the autocratic president Park was 
not satisfied with an economy restricted to producing staple goods and other low skill 
commodities. As stated in the case study, Park thus initiated state intervention in the 
economy and created state-led economic growth. This became the stepping-stone of the 
impressive Korean prosperity, which consequently brought Korea from the periphery 
into the semi-periphery. In the twenty-first century, Korea continues its economic 
prosperity, and is increasingly conducting high skill work and advanced and complex 
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economic activities, and is more likely to move towards the core than to the periphery. 
One can therefore argue that in a neo-Marxist perspective Zambia and Korea have 
changed placed within the global economic system. 
 
State-led development vs Market-based development 
One of the core issues in the debate of the neoliberal strategy is the lack of the  empirical 
evidence. On one hand, critics of the strategy emphasize that there is no historical 
precedent for free-market-based development of a late-industrializing country; thus 
may be not applicable in the case of developing countries. Supporters, on the other hand, 
highlight the short-term economic achievements of countries following the neoliberal 
strategy. So far, however, these successes are much too selective and recent to provide 
sufficient evidence for the ability of the neoliberal strategy to generate sustained growth 
and development (Paus, 1994). Yet, the efficacy of state-led development can be easily 
perceived in the East Asian Tigers, especially in our analysis of the Korean Case. 
 
The paper already proved that the Asian Financial Crisis was the result of weak or no 
state-led political strategy. To fix the crisis, the corporate reform program implemented 
by the IMF and the Korean government set out to dismantle what remained of the 
traditional economic system and liberalized the market with an ‘Anglo-American-style’ 
system. Reforms by the IMF and the World Bank were too driven to cut out the financial 
risk of the system that it ‘over-killed’ the economy in the short-run (Chang, 2006). As an 
alternative, he argues what Korea needed was a revised and reformed version of the 
state-led traditional model, and not a total disassemble. 
 
The new system implemented by the IMF and the World Bank was to ensure the stability 
and the profitability of the financial sector. However, corporate financing has drie d up, 
significantly reducing the investment capability of the corporate sector, national 
investment figures plummeted. Chang is cynical on the new system asserting that it 
“failed to reduce financial risk of the corporate sector, has imposed significant ‘transition 
costs’ on the economy.” And this is likely to reduce the dynamism of the country’s 
corporate sector in the long run. He criticizes that “nowhere in the reform program were 
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the questions of long-term growth and catching-up considered” and the very program is 
likely to damage the future growth prospects for the Korean economy. 
 
An important case in point is the BIS capital adequacy ratio, where it required financial 
institution to correspond to the risk weigh of their assets. Chang asserts that this  is an 
‘unfair’ rule from developing countries’ point of view, as they have relatively scarce 
financial resources but are required to maintain the same capital base per lending. 
Moreover, the pressure on developing-country financial institutions to adopt the BIS 
standard in short time forced the capital base to expand very rapidly, thus creating a 
severe credit crunch, as seen in the case of Korea. The rate of financial risk assets is 
normally higher in developing countries than that for developed countries , which means 
that financial institutions in developing countries must maintain a larger capital base for 
the same amount of loan exposure, compared to their counterparts in developed 
countries. In this sense, the reform the IMF and the World Back brought about were 
seemingly were bias to in favour of the developed and put down the underdeveloped. 
 
To conclude, Chang proposes Korea to build a ‘second-stage catching-up system’ with 
the agenda to revitalize investment dynamism but at the same time managing financial 
risks in the economy. How to get there lies in the hand of Korean bureaucrats. 
Nevertheless, only then will Korea have the chance to upgrade its status from middle -
income country to high-income country. 
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Conclusion 
 
The project has examined and analysed various factors that could have had influence the 
causal links of the political institutions and economic development as independent 
variables. In this final part, the project aims to briefly sum up the main themes dealt in 
the project with some final remarks on the importance of political institutions and its 
economic achievability. 
 
Modernization theorists tend to overemphasize or even justify the action of colonialism 
by hypothesizing that the colonial legacies brought ‘modernizing’ factors in the  eyes of 
the colonized state. However, the project’s two case studies; Zambia and South Korea, 
both colonized until the mid-twentieth century, proves colonialism did not have high 
effect on nations after independence. Case in point, in Zambia, British colo nies had 
never really settled inside the country but left after building infrastructures and left the 
management in the hands of Zambian bureaucrats. Similarly, Japanese infrastructures in 
Korea were shattered during the years of Korean War. In this sense, colonialism may 
have had effect on bringing in new infrastructures for the two colonies; however, the 
influence did not maintain long after independence. In this sense, the project took in 
factors of colonialism as minor influence, rather than a major inf luence for the 
developmental process in the two countries. 
 
While reading up on the theories of development, economic liberalism, in global political 
economic textbooks, appear as the most success in practice; in other words, the so -
called ‘free market’ economies have been highly successful; while state-led economies 
have not. 
 
However, much of the empirical works beg to differ. The case study and the analysis 
disproved liberal market as the answer to economic prosperity; especially among the 
developing countries. Although most developed nations implement the system of 
economic liberalism, it becomes a question of the chicken or the egg; was it liberal 
economics that fostered developed nations or developed nations that saw liberal market 
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fit their economies the best. In addition, capitalistic minded developing countries tend 
to ripe best under state-led economic market. To elaborate, historical observations on 
Korea have shown state-led policies were able to flourish rapid economic development. 
Meanwhile, nations such as Zambia, with ineffective state intervention in market, have 
failed to build sustainable economic development infrastructure. 
 
What’s more, Zambia is highly influenced by liberal economic institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, nevertheless, Zambia has failed to produce results of sufficient 
economic development despite its natural resources. Domestically, the Zambia 
government failed to implement the right type of policy for its stage of development. In 
other words governments were bad at distributing their eggs and put them all in one 
basket – the resource extractive industry. Meanwhile, Korea was able to allocate capital 
and invest in various industries in the correct sectors regarding its economic level; from 
light industry to heavy and chemical industry. In another words, they moved up the 
stage from low skilled work to high skilled work that required advanced and complex 
economic activities. These industries were based on knowledge and technology rather 
than natural resources. In another words, Korea’s new industries were relatively more 
independent from exogenous variables. 
 
In this sense, the project would like to close some remarks on consequences of not 
having a self-sustaining state with concerted mind on economic development. With the 
liberal economic institutions rooted in the Zambian government, keeps the bureaucrats 
from effectively constructing economic development. 
 
Taken this into mind, the paper goes on to suggests that more researches should be 
done on the system of developed states and its market system affecting the political 
institution and economic development of the developing nations. 
 
All in all, as emphasized in the developmental state theory; states must be at the core to 
conduct rational and efficient economic transformation. To put into perspective, state 
must recruit ‘adequate bureaucrats’ in ‘certain institutions’ to effectively collect and 
redistribute of income, centralize and decentralize the right resources and institutions, 
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and get involved in state owned enterprises (SOEs). With this foundation, bureaucrats 
must project efficient policies and strive for economic development that is sustainable 
as “politicians reign whereas bureaucrats rule” (Johnson in Pempel in Woo -Cumings, 
1999: 144). 
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